Paper: arXiv 2404.08757

Authors: Michail Anthropelos, Scott Robertson

Abstract

We consider a market of risky financial assets whose participants are an informed trader, a representative uninformed trader, and noisy liquidity providers. We prove the existence of a market-clearing equilibrium when the insider internalizes her power to impact prices, but the uninformed trader takes prices as given. Compared to the associated competitive economy, in equilibrium the insider strategically reveals a noisier signal, and prices are less reactive to publicly available information. Additionally, and in direct contrast to the related literature, in equilibrium the insider’s indirect utility monotonically increases in the signal precision. Therefore, the insider is motivated not only to obtain, but also to refine, her signal. Lastly, we show that compared to the competitive economy, the insider’s internalization of price impact is utility improving for the uninformed trader, but somewhat surprisingly may be utility decreasing for the insider herself. This utility reduction occurs provided the insider is sufficiently risk averse compared to the uninformed trader, and provided the signal is of sufficiently low quality.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 8.5/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10
  • Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing

Why this score: The paper is heavily mathematical, featuring analytical proofs, derivations of equilibrium conditions via cubic equations, and comparative statics in a CARA-normal framework, earning a high math complexity score. However, it is purely theoretical with no backtesting, data analysis, or implementation details, resulting in low empirical rigor.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal<br>Study strategic informed trading<br>with price impact internalization"] --> B["Model Setup"]
  
  B --> C{"Market Participants<br>and Assets"}
  C --> D["Informed Trader<br>Strategic, Risk-Averse"]
  C --> E["Uninformed Trader<br>Price-Taker, Competitive"]
  C --> F["Noisy Liquidity Providers<br>Supply noise"]
  
  B --> G["Key Methodology<br>Equilibrium Analysis"]
  G --> H["Signal Structure<br>Private signal + public info"]
  G --> I["Price Formation<br>Clearing condition internalized"]
  
  D --> J["Computational Process<br>Solve Equilibrium"]
  E --> J
  F --> J
  H --> J
  I --> J
  
  J --> K["Key Findings"]
  
  K --> L["Equilibrium Outcomes"]
  L --> M["Signal revelation is noisier"]
  L --> N["Prices less reactive to public info"]
  
  K --> O["Insider Utility Properties"]
  O --> P["Utility increases in signal precision<br>Rationale for refining signals"]
  O --> Q["Utility may decrease vs. competitive<br>When risk-averse & low quality signal"]
  
  K --> R["Welfare Implications"]
  R --> S["Uninformed trader utility improves"]
  R --> T["Price impact internalization benefit"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper extends the single‑period CARA‑normal Grossman‑Stiglitz model by allowing the insider to internalize her linear price impact while the uninformed trader remains price‑taking, and studies the resulting linear‑impact equilibrium.

Source sentence
Methodology and Main Contributions. We adjust the single period CARA-normal setting of Grossman and Stiglitz [1980]1 by allowing the insider to internalize her price impact, while maintaining the presence of price-taking uninformed traders and liquidity providers2.

Assumes 6

  • The market consists of risky assets traded by an informed insider, a representative uninformed trader, and noisy liquidity providers. market
    Source sentence
    We consider a market of risky financial assets whose participants are an informed trader, a representative uninformed trader, and noisy liquidity providers.
  • Agents have CARA utility and the underlying payoff distribution is normal (single‑period CARA‑normal setting). model
    Source sentence
    We adjust the single period CARA-normal setting of Grossman and Stiglitz [1980]1 by allowing the insider to internalize her price impact, while maintaining the presence of price-taking uninformed traders and liquidity providers2.
  • The insider internalizes the effect of her own demand on the market price (price‑impact internalization). model
    Source sentence
    We adjust the single period CARA-normal setting of Grossman and Stiglitz [1980]1 by allowing the insider to internalize her price impact, while maintaining the presence of price-taking uninformed traders and liquidity providers2.
  • The uninformed trader treats the price as given (price‑taking). model
    Source sentence
    We adjust the single period CARA-normal setting of Grossman and Stiglitz [1980]1 by allowing the insider to internalize her price impact, while maintaining the presence of price-taking uninformed traders and liquidity providers2.
Show 2 more
  • Price impact is linear in total order flow. model
    Source sentence
    Our assumption of linear price impact is moti-vated by the price-taking case.
  • Precision matrices satisfy PI = pI PX and PN = pN PX⁻¹ for scalars pI, pN > 0 (Assumption A.4). model
    Source sentence
    PI = pIPX and PN = pNP −1 X for scalars pI, pN > 0.

Data

No dataset named in the text.

Costs

Not applicable The paper reports no trading or execution result.

Finds 5

  • In equilibrium the insider strategically reveals a noisier signal, making prices less reactive to public information compared to the competitive (price‑taking) economy. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Compared to the associated competitive economy, in equilibrium the insider strategically reveals a noisier signal, and prices are less reactive to publicly available information.
  • Insider’s indirect utility is monotonically increasing in the precision of her private signal (Theorem 3.2). theoretical
    Source sentence
    Our main result shows that insider ex-ante utility is monotonically increasing in the private signal precision (Theorem 3.2).
  • Internalizing price impact improves the uninformed trader’s utility relative to the competitive economy. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Lastly, we show that compared to the competitive economy, the insider's internalization of price impact is utility improving for the uninformed trader, but somewhat surprisingly may be utility decreasing for the insider herself.
  • If the insider is sufficiently risk‑averse and the signal is of low quality, internalizing price impact can reduce the insider’s utility. theoretical
    Source sentence
    This utility reduction occurs provided the insider is sufficiently risk averse compared to the uninformed trader, and provided the signal is of sufficiently low quality.
  • Both insider and uninformed trader interim utilities always increase when the insider internalizes price impact (Proposition 3.6). theoretical figure from elsewhere in the paper
    Source sentence
    As pI →0 we obtain the almost sure limits for the insider lim pI→0 CEI 0(G, ZN) = CEI nsn + λ2 2αI Z2 N, lim pI→0 CEI 0,ι(G, ZN) = CEI nsn + λ2 2(1 −λ2)αI Z2 N. Therefore, insider interim utility always increases when internalizing price impact. For the unin-formed trader we obtain almost surely lim pI→0 CEU 0 (H) = CEI nsn + αUλ2 2α2 I Z2 N, lim pI→0 CEU 0,ι(Hι) = CEI nsn + αUλ2 2α2 I(1 −λ2)2 Z2 N, and hence

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 14 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.