Paper: arXiv 2312.09654
Authors: Umberto Natale, Michael Moser
Abstract
We present a comprehensive analysis of the implications of artificial latency in the Proposer-Builder Separation framework on the Ethereum network. Focusing on the MEV-Boost auction system, we analyze how strategic latency manipulation affects Maximum Extractable Value yields and network integrity. Our findings reveal both increased profitability for node operators and significant systemic challenges, including heightened network inefficiencies and centralization risks. We empirically validates these insights with a pilot that Chorus One has been operating on Ethereum mainnet. We demonstrate the nuanced effects of latency on bid selection and validator dynamics. Ultimately, this research underscores the need for balanced strategies that optimize Maximum Extractable Value capture while preserving the Ethereum network’s decentralization ethos.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 4.0/10
- Empirical Rigor: 7.5/10
- Quadrant: Street Traders — empirical and applied, lower math complexity
Why this score: The paper introduces formal metrics (e.g., normalized bid ratio R) and discusses economic concepts like LVR, but the math is relatively accessible compared to deep theoretical models. Empirical rigor is high due to the use of a live pilot on Ethereum mainnet, proprietary data analysis, and specific statistical metrics (e.g., quantiles, regression) to validate findings on bid dynamics and profitability.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD A["Research Goal<br>Analyze artificial latency impact in PBS on Ethereum"] --> B["Data & Inputs<br>Ethereum Mainnet MEV-Boost Data<br>Chorus One Pilot Dataset"] B --> C["Methodology<br>Empirical Analysis of Latency Manipulation"] C --> D["Computation<br>MEV Yield Modeling<br>Bid Selection Simulation"] D --> E["Key Findings<br>Increased Profitability vs.<br>Network Inefficiency & Centralization Risks"]
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper proposes a latency‑optimization strategy called Adagio that deliberately delays getHeader requests to capture more MEV in the MEV‑Boost auction.
Source sentence
Our setup strategically delays getHeader requests to maximize Maximum Extractable Value (MEV) capture; correspondingly, we’ve dubbed it Adagio.
Assumes 4
- Strategic latency optimization is a zero‑sum game that can compromise node‑operator independence. other
Source sentence
We argue that strategic latency optimization is a zero sum game which may increasingly compromise node operator independence in favor of statistical arbitrageurs.
- All node operators are incentivized to compete for latency‑optimized MEV capture regardless of voting power. market
Source sentence
We illustrated that all node operators are incentivized to compete for latency‑optimized MEV capture, irrespective of their voting power.
- A static delay can be used to model eligibility‑time effects in the theoretical framework. model
Source sentence
In our theoretical framework, we assumed a static delay (see. Fig. 4); in practice, we observe a fluctuation in the eligibility time distribution.
- The increase in ETH burn directly reduces proposer revenue proportionally. execution
Source sentence
While the base fee increases, if the opportunity for MEV extraction remains constant, builders are compelled to adjust the final portion of rewards they are willing to pay, effectively burning a part of what could have been the proposer’s income.
Data
- Adagio pilot crypto-onchain proprietary
Source sentence
We empirically validates these insights with a pilot that Chorus One has been operating on Ethereum mainnet.
Costs
Modeled
A 0.5% rise in burnt ETH reduces MEV reward by about 3.9%, reflecting hidden gas‑cost externalities.
Source sentence
A 0.5% rise in burnt ETH translates into a tangible reduction in MEV rewards. For example, if an original MEV reward is 0.077 ETH with a burnt fee of 0.633 ETH, a 0.5% increase in burnt ETH would lower the MEV reward to approximately 0.074 ETH. This reduction represents a subtle yet impactful 3.9% decrease in the propo
Finds 4
- Artificial latency increases the share of ETH burned in subsequent slots, raising gas costs for later proposers. negative
Source sentence
the graph explicitly demonstrates that as bids rise during the auction, so does the gas price for the next slot, leading to a larger share of burned ETH in subsequent slots.
- A modest 0.5% increase in burnt ETH can cut MEV rewards by roughly 3.9%, highlighting a tangible revenue loss for proposers. performance
Source sentence
This reduction represents a subtle yet impactful 3.9% decrease in the proposer’s revenue.
- The empirical Adagio data shows a wider variance and higher cumulative probability of MEV increases per block compared to the theoretical model, skewing toward lower MEV gains. statistical
Source sentence
The probability density function shows a wider variance with a higher cumulative probability. This indicates that while the experiment leads to a broader range of outcomes, it skews towards relatively lower MEV increases in the
- Latency‑optimized setups raise the base fee and create a long‑tail distribution of ETH‑burn increases, imposing hidden costs on smaller node operators. negative
Source sentence
We demonstrated that artificial latency can result in a higher base fee, and that the long tail of the percentage increase in ETH burned poses a s
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 18 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
1 paper in the archive
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.