The End of History for Corporate Law

ArXiv ID: ssrn-204528 “View on arXiv”

Authors: Unknown

Abstract

Despite the apparent divergence in institutions of governance, share ownership, capital markets, and business culture across developed economies, the basic law

Keywords: corporate governance, share ownership, capital markets, business culture, legal institutions, Equities

Complexity vs Empirical Score

• Math Complexity: 1.5/10
• Empirical Rigor: 0.5/10
• Quadrant: Philosophers
• Why: The paper is purely conceptual, discussing legal and normative consensus in corporate law without any mathematical formulas or empirical data; it is a theoretical analysis of legal convergence.

  flowchart TD
    A["Research Goal: Do cross-country differences in governance, ownership, and capital markets constitute a fundamental divergence, or is there a convergence?"] --> B["Methodology: Comparative Legal & Financial Analysis"]
    B --> C["Data Inputs: Legal doctrines, share ownership structures, capital market depth, business culture metrics"]
    C --> D["Analysis: Pattern matching across developed economies"]
    D --> E["Finding 1: Convergent forces dominate; legal forms converge toward shareholder primacy."]
    D --> F["Finding 2: Institutional differences (ownership, culture) persist but do not alter the core economic logic."]
    E --> G["Outcome: 'End of History' thesis—market forces select efficient, shareholder-centric corporate law."]
    F --> G