Paper: arXiv 2604.26076
Authors: Mikhail Perepelitsa
Abstract
This paper introduces a heterogeneous macroeconomic model of a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) network to analyze the long-term centralizing effects of external traditional finance (TradFi) yields. We model a continuum of rational actors divided into two distinct classes: investors, who optimize portfolios between staking and external variance-dominated investments, and consumers, who balance staking yields against the transactional utility of holding liquid assets. By employing a quasi-linear utility function to model consumer behavior, we derive a cubic polynomial that strictly defines the unique macroeconomic equilibrium of the coupled network. The model demonstrates that, at scale, external macroeconomic factors force the complete institutional capture of the PoS consensus layer. Because investors have access to external risk premiums, their wealth compounds exponentially, leading to massive capital inflows that crush the protocol’s internal staking yield to effectively zero. We show that as the yield is crushed, consumer wealth becomes strictly upper-bounded. Ultimately, consumers are forced to cease staking entirely and hold all remaining wealth in liquid form to satisfy their transactional constraints.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 7.5/10
- Empirical Rigor: 2.5/10
- Quadrant: Lab Rats — theoretically deep, empirically untested
Why this score: The paper presents a rigorous theoretical framework using heterogeneous agents, portfolio optimization, and closed-form equilibrium derivations to address PoS centralization. However, it is purely theoretical and completely lacks empirical backtesting or real-world crypto dataset validation.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD
A["Research Question: Long-term impact of TradFi yields on PoS decentralization"] --> B["Inputs: Exogenous Risk Premiums & Dual-Agent Model (Investors vs. Consumers)"]
B --> C["Methodology: Portfolio optimization & Quasi-linear utility functions"]
C --> D["Process: Solve cubic polynomial for unique macroeconomic equilibrium"]
D --> E["Finding 1: Investor inflows crush internal PoS staking yield to near zero"]
D --> F["Finding 2: Consumers cease staking; wealth becomes upper-bounded"]
E & F --> G["Outcome: Asymptotic centralization and institutional capture of PoS"]
Cited References (14)
- A Macro Finance Model for Proof-of-Stake Ethereum (2025)
- Optimal Issuance for Proof-of-Stake Blockchains (2025)
- Tokenomics: Optimal Monetary and Fee Policies (2025) — link
- Blockchain without Waste: Proof-of-Stake (2021)
- Evolution of Shares in a Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrency (2021) — link
- Economics of Proof-of-Stake Payment Systems (2019)
- Tokenomics: Dynamic Adoption and Valuation (2021) — link
- Equilibrium Staking Levels in a Proof-of-Stake Blockchain (2021) — link
and 6 more
- The Merge - A Deep Dive With Nansen (2022) — link
- GOOSE-2025 & EGGs-2025 Final Report (2026) — link
- Transaction Fee Mechanism Design (2021)
- Studying the Compounding Effect: The Role of Proof-of-Stake Parameters on Wealth Distribution (2023) — link
- The Financialization of Proof-of-Stake: Asymptotic Centralization under Exogenous Risk Premiums (2026) — link
- Competitive equilibria between staking and on-chain lending (2020) — link
0 of 14 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2518 linked papers.