Paper: arXiv 2508.04003
Authors: Bruce Mizrach, Nathaniel Yoshida
Abstract
Two MEV builders now produce nearly 80% of Ethereum blocks. Block builders have the ability to reorder transactions on the blockchain in a way that can be harmful to participants. We estimate they would pay in the aggregate nearly $14 million per month to ensure that they remained in the first quartile of the block. Sandwich attacks, in which a transaction is front-run, are frequent, averaging more than one per block. Gas fees on these transactions pay for nearly 15% of the MEV payments to the validator. These attacks have especially large marginal effects and skew the distribution. Reforms such as gas fee priority or private transaction pools might be helpful.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 4.0/10
- Empirical Rigor: 7.0/10
- Quadrant: Street Traders — empirical and applied, lower math complexity
Why this score: The paper uses advanced econometric modeling (probit) to estimate marginal effects, but the math is not highly abstract or theoretical, focusing on empirical measurement; it is heavily data-driven with specific datasets (Google Big Query, Mevboost.pics), statistical metrics, and real-world transaction analysis, making it backtest-ready.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD
A["Research Goal:<br>Estimate Marginal Effects<br>of Ethereum MEV Re-Ordering"] --> B["Methodology:<br>Statistical Analysis of<br>Block Builder Data"]
B --> C{"Data Inputs"}
C --> C1["Blockchain Blocks"]
C --> C2["Transaction Orderings"]
C --> C3["MEV Payments"]
C --> C4["Gas Fee Structures"]
B --> D["Computational Process:<br>Aggregate & Marginal<br>Effect Estimation"]
D --> E["Key Findings & Outcomes"]
E --> E1["Market Consolidation:<br>2 builders produce ~80% of blocks"]
E --> E2["Economic Impact:<br>$14M/month to stay in Q1"]
E --> E3["Attack Frequency:<br>>1 Sandwich Attack per block"]
E --> E4["Reform Suggestions:<br>Gas priority/Private pools"]
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper estimates the marginal effects of MEV transaction re‑ordering on block placement and quantifies associated costs to participants.
Source sentence
We estimate the marginal effects of MEV transaction re‑ordering and find that in our baseline model, investors would pay nearly $14 million to ensure that they remained in the first quartile of the block.
Assumes 5
- The error term follows a normal distribution, allowing use of an ordered probit model. model
Source sentence
where F is the cumulative normal distribution function.
- Transaction characteristics are captured by dummy variables for mempool position, DEX/MEV involvement, and maximum fee per gas. model
Source sentence
X contains three dummy variables corresponding to a transaction’s position in the mempool, dummy variables denoting a transaction going to and from a DEX, to and from an MEV agent, and a measure of the maximum fee in gas units a participant will commit to the transaction.
- Gas fees are measured in ETH and converted to USD using CoinGecko spot prices. data
Source sentence
To put these gas fees into context, we first convert them to USD using Coin Gecko prices.
- Back‑run transactions incur higher gas fees than other legs of the sandwich. other
Source sentence
One important thing we have identified is that the back‑run transaction, in which the attacker flattens their position and records a profit, pays substantially higher gas fees than other transactions.
Show 1 more
- Sandwich cost and number of sandwich transactions drive the skewness of marginal effects. statistical
Source sentence
The cost of the sandwich is highly statistically significant and positively correlated with marginal effects, indicating that costlier sandwich transactions are subject to more reordering.
Data
- Ethereum on‑chain transaction data (October 2024) crypto-onchain public
Source sentence
The sandwich positions are from EigenPhi and the gas fees are from Google Big Query. The sample is the month of October 2024.
- MEV builder addresses crypto-onchain public
Source sentence
tify MEV builders are from MEVBoost.pics.
- DEX and CEX address list crypto-onchain public
Source sentence
Addresses for centralized exchanges (CEX) and decentralized exchanges (DEX) are from Brian Lect’s Github,26 and all active addresses were confirmed manually from Etherscan.
- ETH price data market-prices public
Source sentence
The average ETH price for the month of October 2024 was $2,520.05
Costs
Unclear - sources disagree
Source sentence (the authors' words)
The average ETH price for the month of October 2024 was $2,520.05, so the back run transaction fees averaged $62.70. For the 125,829 sandwich attacks in the month, we
Finds 4
- Block builders collectively pay about $14 million per month to stay in the first quartile of block placement. statistical
Source sentence
We estimate they would pay in the aggregate nearly $14 million per month to ensure that they remained in the first quartile of the block.
- Sandwich attacks occur on average more than once per block, with 124,946 attacks in October 2024. performance
Source sentence
Sandwich attacks, in which a transaction is front‑run, are frequent, averaging more than one per block.
- Front‑run transactions are about 75.86% more likely to appear in the first block quartile; back‑run about 72.46%. statistical
Source sentence
The marginal effects for back run transactions are similarly large, averaging 72.46% for October 2024.
- Each additional sandwich transaction in a block raises marginal effects by ~0.04075 (≈4.1% higher chance of first‑quartile placement). statistical
Source sentence
An additional sandwich transaction within a block is associated with an increase in the marginal effects of 0.04075. This means that an additional sandwich transaction within a block corresponds to a transaction being approximately 4.1% more likely to appear in the first quartile of block transactions.
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 19 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
1 paper in the archive
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.
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4 of 121 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.