The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership

ArXiv ID: ssrn-904004 “View on arXiv”

Authors: Unknown

Abstract

Corporate law generally makes voting power proportional to economic ownership. This serves several goals. Economic ownership gives shareholders an incentive to

Keywords: Corporate Law, Voting Rights, Shareholder Economics, Ownership Structure, Asset Class: Equities

Complexity vs Empirical Score

• Math Complexity: 1.0/10
• Empirical Rigor: 0.0/10
• Quadrant: Philosophers
• Why: The paper focuses on legal and financial theory regarding shareholder voting structures, with no advanced mathematics or empirical backtesting presented in the excerpt.

  flowchart TD
    A["Research Goal: Analyze deviations from the voting-economic ownership link in corporate law"]
    B["Methodology: Legal & Economic Analysis of complex equity derivatives & structures"]
    C["Data/Inputs: Corporate governance case studies, SEC filings, Swap agreements"]
    D["Computational Process: Linking economic exposure to voting rights under existing statutes"]
    A --> B
    B --> C
    C --> D
    D --> E["Key Findings/Outcomes: <br>1. Empty Voting (voting > economic stake)<br>2. Hidden/Morphable Ownership (economic > reported stake)<br>3. Decoupling undermines shareholder primacy"]