Paper: arXiv 2309.14201

Authors: Tarun Chitra

Abstract

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) is value extractable by temporary monopoly power commonly found in decentralized systems. This extraction stems from a lack of user privacy upon transaction submission and the ability of a monopolist validator to reorder, add, and/or censor transactions. There are two main directions to reduce MEV: reduce the flexibility of the miner to reorder transactions by enforcing ordering rules and/or introduce a competitive market for the right to reorder, add, and/or censor transactions. In this work, we unify these approaches via \emph{“uncertainty principles”}, akin to those found in harmonic analysis and physics. This provides a quantitative trade-off between the freedom to reorder transactions and the complexity of an economic payoff to a user in a decentralized network. This trade off is analogous to the Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem and demonstrates that sequencing rules in blockchains need to be application specific. Our results suggest that neither so-called fair ordering techniques nor economic mechanisms can individually mitigate MEV for arbitrary payoff functions.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 8.5/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10
  • Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing

Why this score: The paper introduces abstract mathematical tools like uncertainty principles and discrete harmonic analysis to formalize the trade-offs in MEV, indicating high mathematical complexity. However, it lacks any empirical backtesting or dataset implementation, focusing solely on theoretical proofs and analogies without practical validation.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal<br>Quantify the fundamental trade-off<br>between ordering flexibility and user payoff complexity<br>to mitigate Maximal Extractable Value"] --> B{"Methodology"}
  
  B --> C["Unify Ordering & Economic Approaches<br>via Uncertainty Principles"]
  B --> D["Model Monopolist Validator<br>with Reorder/Censorship Power"]
  
  C --> E
  D --> E
  
  subgraph E ["Computational Process"]
      E1["Define User Privacy<br>as System State Uncertainty"]
      E2["Formulate Trade-off<br>Freedom to Reorder vs<br>Economic Payoff Complexity"]
      E3["Apply Harmonic Analysis<br>Similar to Nyquist-Shannon Theorem"]
  end
  
  E --> F["Key Findings & Outcomes"]
  
  F --> G["MEV Mitigation requires<br>Application-Specific Sequencing Rules"]
  F --> H["Economic mechanisms alone<br>cannot mitigate MEV for arbitrary payoffs"]
  F --> I["Fair ordering techniques alone<br>cannot mitigate MEV for arbitrary payoffs"]
  
  G --> J(("End: Unified Theory<br>of MEV via Uncertainty"))
  H --> J
  I --> J

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper proposes a unified framework for MEV mitigation using uncertainty principles that quantify the trade‑off between transaction reordering freedom and economic payoff complexity.

Source sentence
In this work, we unify these approaches via \emph{uncertainty principles}, akin to those found in harmonic analysis and physics.

Assumes 3

  • There is a fixed set of transactions T1,…,Tn and a payoff function f(T1,…,Tn) that yields the validator’s payoff for a particular ordering. model
    Source sentence
    We assume that there is a fixed set of transactions T1, . . . , Tn and a payofffunction f(T1, . . . , Tn) that yields the payoffto a validator for a particular ordering.
  • Validators are chosen proportionally to locked resources, giving them temporary monopoly power to include, exclude, or reorder transactions. market
    Source sentence
    Most consensus mechanisms, such as Proof of Work or Proof of Stake, have the probability of a validator Vi being chosen proportional to the amount of resource they locked. 2.2 MEV The temporary monopoly guaranteed to a single validator affords them the opportunity to include, exclude, or reorder transactions to maximize a validator’s profit.
  • The analysis treats the payoff function as a black‑box f: S_n → ℝ accessible via queries. model
    Source sentence
    Our results in §3 will show that if |A| is sufficiently ‘large’, then one can achieve non-trivial fairness guarantees whereas if |A| is too ‘small’ then one has fairness lower bounds for Λ+. Suppose that one could decompose a general payofff : Sn →R into a sum of indicator functions on sets A ⊂Sn, f = P A⊂Sn ˆf(A)1A and quantify the size of the coefficients | ˆf(A)|.

Data

No dataset named in the text.

Costs

Not applicable The paper reports no trading or execution result.

Finds 5

  • Neither fair‑ordering techniques nor economic mechanisms alone can mitigate MEV for arbitrary payoff functions. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Our results suggest that neither so-called fair ordering techniques nor economic mechanisms can individually mitigate MEV for arbitrary payoff functions.
  • If the set of allowed permutations A is sufficiently large, non‑trivial fairness guarantees can be achieved; if A is too small, fairness lower bounds hold. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Our results in §3 will show that if |A| is sufficiently ‘large’, then one can achieve non-trivial fairness guarantees whereas if |A| is too ‘small’ then one has fairness lower bounds for Λ+. If a particular monotone function of |A| is smaller than deg(f), then we will show fairness functional lower bounds.
  • The boolean degree of the payoff function controls the complexity of sequencing rules needed for fairness; high‑degree functions (e.g., liquidations) require more complex rules. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Each application can be viewed as represented by a payoff f : Sn →R and the boolean degree of f controls the complexity of sequence rules needed. 3.2 Implications for Fair Ordering As mentioned in §2.5, most fair ordering protocols generate t-intersecting sets of permuta-tions.
  • Sequencing rules that generate high intersection numbers (t = Θ(n)) are fair for most payoff functions, whereas rules with t = o(n) can cause increased unfairness for high‑degree payoffs. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Our results suggest that fair ordering protocols that only guarantee t = o(n) are likely to cause increased unfairness for payofffunctions f with deg(f) = Ω(n). On the other hand, the upper bounds of Claim 2 suggest that if fair ordering protocols (or general sequencing rules, such as those of [XFP23]) are able to consistently generate high intersection numbers (e.g. t = Θ(n)), then they are fair for ‘most’
  • Theoretical bounds on fairness can be expressed via Fourier/representation‑theoretic analysis, linking permutation overlap to measures of unfairness. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Suppose that one could decompose a general payofff : Sn →R into a sum of indicator functions on sets A ⊂Sn, f = P A⊂Sn ˆf(A)1A and quantify the size of the coefficients | ˆf(A)|. The Fourier Transform over finite groups precisely characterizes how to decompose a function into a basis of indicator functions and compute these coefficients.

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 17 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Cited by 1 paper in the archive (1 by independent authors)

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.