Vote Delegation in DeFi Governance

ArXiv ID: 2503.11940 “View on arXiv”

Authors: Unknown

Abstract

We investigate the drivers of vote delegation in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), using the Uniswap governance DAO as a laboratory. We show that parties with fewer self-owned votes and those affiliated with the controlling venture capital firm, Andreesen Horowitz (a16z), receive more vote delegations. These patterns suggest that while the Uniswap ecosystem values decentralization, a16z may engage in window-dressing around it. Moreover, we find that an active and successful track record in submitting improvement proposals, especially in the final stage, leads to more vote delegations, indicating that delegation in DAOs is at least partly reputation- or merit-based. Combined, our findings provide new insights into how governance and decentralization operate in DeFi.

Keywords: Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), Governance, Vote Delegation, Uniswap, Venture Capital Influence, Decentralized Finance (DeFi)

Complexity vs Empirical Score

• Math Complexity: 2.0/10
• Empirical Rigor: 8.0/10
• Quadrant: Street Traders
• Why: The paper relies on empirical regression analysis of on-chain data from the Uniswap DAO, involving extensive data collection and statistical modeling, while the mathematical content is primarily conceptual and econometric without dense derivations or advanced theory.

  flowchart TD
    A["Research Question\nDrivers of Vote Delegation in DAOs?"] --> B["Methodology\nUniswap Governance DAO as Laboratory"]
    B --> C["Data Inputs\n1. Delegate voting power\n2. VC affiliation (a16z)\n3. Proposal track record"]
    C --> D["Analysis\nRegression & Statistical Testing"]
    D --> E["Key Findings\n1. VC (a16z) receives more delegations\n2. Successful proposers gain delegation\n3. Evidence of VC 'window-dressing'"]