Paper: arXiv 2503.11940

Authors: Dion Bongaerts, Thomas Lambert, Daniel Liebau, Peter Roosenboom

Abstract

We investigate the drivers of vote delegation in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), using the Uniswap governance DAO as a laboratory. We show that parties with fewer self-owned votes and those affiliated with the controlling venture capital firm, Andreesen Horowitz (a16z), receive more vote delegations. These patterns suggest that while the Uniswap ecosystem values decentralization, a16z may engage in window-dressing around it. Moreover, we find that an active and successful track record in submitting improvement proposals, especially in the final stage, leads to more vote delegations, indicating that delegation in DAOs is at least partly reputation- or merit-based. Combined, our findings provide new insights into how governance and decentralization operate in DeFi.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 2.0/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 8.0/10
  • Quadrant: Street Traders — empirical and applied, lower math complexity

Why this score: The paper relies on empirical regression analysis of on-chain data from the Uniswap DAO, involving extensive data collection and statistical modeling, while the mathematical content is primarily conceptual and econometric without dense derivations or advanced theory.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Question<br>Drivers of Vote Delegation in DAOs?"] --> B["Methodology<br>Uniswap Governance DAO as Laboratory"]
  B --> C["Data Inputs<br>1. Delegate voting power<br>2. VC affiliation (a16z)<br>3. Proposal track record"]
  C --> D["Analysis<br>Regression & Statistical Testing"]
  D --> E["Key Findings<br>1. VC (a16z) receives more delegations<br>2. Successful proposers gain delegation<br>3. Evidence of VC 'window-dressing'"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper investigates the drivers of vote delegation in Uniswap DAO, testing three hypotheses and providing evidence that delegation is influenced by token holders' desire for decentralization, delegate reputation from successful proposals, and affiliation with a16z.

Source sentence
We investigate the drivers of vote delegation in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), using the Uniswap governance DAO as a laboratory. We examine vote delegation patterns in DAOs by testing three hypotheses.

Assumes

No explicit assumptions found in the text.

Data

  • Vote delegation panel data (Top5 wallets) crypto-onchain public
    2020-09-17 to 2022-04-15 · 84 unique top‑5 wallets, 47,808 daily observations
    Source sentence
    Our sample consists of wallets that, at any point between September 2020 and April 2022, were among the top 5 voters for a given voting event (we coin this group the “Top5” voters). We dedicate substantial effort in collecting data on the characteristics and voting history of these wallets from on- and off-chain data.3 Our final sample includes 47,808 daily observations of vote delegations (to oneself and others),
  • CoinGecko market data · CoinGecko alternative public
    starting September 19, 2020
    Source sentence
    To identify a16z affiliates we refer to the investor webpage and then look up wallets based on matching ENS names.16 We also construct market-related variables, for which we obtain data from CoinGecko starting from September 19, 2020, primarily to serve as market-wide controls. The market-wide control variables we collect also include the log of the UNI token market capitalization, trading volume, the Fear & Greed

Recognised sources: CoinGecko Binance Coinbase

Costs

Not applicable The paper reports no trading or execution result; the cost the extractor found is a model parameter.

The paper-text extraction found a cost parameter inside a model (Gas fees are incurred when delegations are reversed or re‑delegated, but costs are not incorporated into the main regression results.); the classifier found no reported trading result, so costs are not applicable.

Finds 5

  • Parties with fewer self‑owned votes and those affiliated with Andreessen Horowitz receive more vote delegations. statistical
    Source sentence
    We show that parties with fewer self-owned votes and those affiliated with the controlling venture capital firm, Andreesen Horowitz (a16z), receive more vote delegations.
  • An active and successful track record in submitting improvement proposals, especially at the final on‑chain vote stage, leads to substantially more delegations. statistical
    Source sentence
    Moreover, we find that an active and successful track record in submitting improvement proposals, especially in the final stage, leads to more vote delegations, indicating that delegation in DAOs is at least partly reputation- or merit-based. Economically, this implies that having previously put forward a proposal is associated with receiving approximately 59 times more votes than never having proposed, suggesting
  • No support is found for the hypothesis that wallets with larger UNI holdings attract more delegated votes. negative
    Source sentence
    First, we do not find support for our first hypothesis that wallets with larger UNI token holdings should attract more delegated votes than those with smaller holdings.
  • Delegation decisions are not driven by individual voting events but appear to be long‑term choices. statistical
    Source sentence
    This suggests that delegation decisions are not driven by individual voting events.
  • Having previously proposed a governance proposal is associated with receiving about 59 times more delegated votes, and proposing for an on‑chain vote yields about 101 times more. statistical
    Source sentence
    Economically, this implies that having previously put forward a proposal is associated with receiving approximately 59 times more votes than never having proposed, suggesting that delegators prefer to delegate voting power to those who not only vote but also actively engage in governance by submitting proposals. Notably, having previously proposed 18 an on-chain vote is associated with receiving approximately 101

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 11 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.

Cited References (45)

  1. The evolution of decentralized exchange: Risks, benefits, and oversight (2026) — link
  2. Voting Governance and Value Creation in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) (2025) — link
  3. DAO Research Trends: Reflections and Learnings from the First European DAO Workshop (DAWO) (2025) — link
  4. Spillovers in Crowdfunding (2025) — link
  5. Kite: How to Delegate Voting Power Privately (2025) — link
  6. A review of DAO governance: Recent literature and emerging trends (2025) — link
  7. Decentralized Exchange: The Uniswap Automated Market Maker (2024) — link
  8. Blockchain Governance in the Wild (2024) — link
and 37 more
  1. DAO Decentralization: Voting-Bloc Entropy, Bribery, and Dark DAOs (2023) — link
  2. Trading and Shareholder Democracy (2023) — link
  3. The Conceptual Flaws of Decentralized Automated Market Making (2023) — link
  4. The technology of decentralized finance (DeFi) (2023) — link
  5. Control of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (2023) — link
  6. A Survey on Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) and Their Governance (2023) — link
  7. The Hidden Shortcomings of (D)AOs - An Empirical Study of On-Chain Governance (2023) — link
  8. Decentralized Finance (2023) — link
  9. The rise of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs): a first empirical glimpse (2022) — link
  10. Analyzing Voting Power in Decentralized Governance: Who controls DAOs? (2022) — link
  11. Decentralization illusion in Decentralized Finance: Evidence from tokenized voting in MakerDAO polls (2022) — link
  12. Decentralized Autonomous Organization (2021) — link
  13. The Adoption of Blockchain-based Decentralized Exchanges: A Market Microstructure Analysis of the Automated Market Maker (2021) — link
  14. The Costs and Benefits of Shareholder Democracy: Gadflies and Low-Cost Activism (2020) — link
  15. Decentralized vs. Distributed Organization: Blockchain, Machine Learning and the Future of the Digital Platform (2020) — link
  16. Blockchain disruption and decentralized finance: The rise of decentralized business models (2020) — link
  17. Decentralized Finance: On Blockchain- and Smart Contract-Based Financial Markets (2020) — link
  18. The Wisdom of Crowds in FinTech: Evidence from Initial Coin Offerings (2019) — link
  19. The Experts in the Crowd: The Role of Experienced Investors in a Crowdfunding Market (2019) — link
  20. Opportunistic Proposals by Union Shareholders (2018) — link
  21. Bitcoin and the rise of decentralized autonomous organizations (2017) — link
  22. The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design (2016) — link
  23. What Else Do Shareholders Want? Shareholder Proposals Contested by Firm Management (2016) — link
  24. Ties that Bind: How Business Connections Affect Mutual Fund Activism (2016) — link
  25. Does Skin in the Game Matter? Director Incentives and Governance in the Mutual Fund Industry (2009) — link
  26. Corporate Governance and Control (2003) — link
  27. Separation of Ownership and Control (1983) — link
  28. DAO Governance (2023) — link
  29. The Economics of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (2023) — link
  30. Will Blockchains Disintermediate Platforms? The Problem of Credible Decentralization in Daos (2022) — link
  31. Smart Contracts and Decentralized Finance (2022) — link
  32. Risky vote delegation (2022)
  33. From Centralized to Decentralized Finance: The Issue of “Fake-DeFi” (2021) — link
  34. Regulation of Decentralized Systems: A Study of Uniswap (2021)
  35. Formal and Real Authority in Organizations: An Empirical Assessment (2009)
  36. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report 446 Fund Managers, Career Concerns, and Asset Price Volatility *
    1. Voting power

0 of 45 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.