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The World Price of Insider Trading

The World Price of Insider Trading ArXiv ID: ssrn-249708 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract The existence and the enforcement of insider trading laws in stock markets is a phenomenon of the 1990s. A study of the 103 countries that have stock markets re Keywords: Insider Trading Laws, Market Regulation, Investor Protection, Legal Enforcement, Stock Market Efficiency, Equities Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 2.5/10 Empirical Rigor: 8.0/10 Quadrant: Street Traders Why: The paper relies on descriptive statistics, international asset pricing factor models, and regressions with country-level controls, which involve standard empirical finance methods rather than advanced mathematics. However, it demonstrates high empirical rigor by compiling a comprehensive dataset from 103 countries, using multiple econometric approaches to address the research question, and focusing on measurable outcomes like cost of equity. flowchart TD A["Research Goal<br>What is the world price of<br>insider trading laws?"] --> B["Methodology<br>Econometric analysis of 103 countries"] B --> C["Data Inputs<br>Stock market returns<br>Enforcement indicators"] C --> D["Computational Process<br>Regression analysis of market efficiency"] D --> E["Key Findings<br>Insider trading laws increase<br>market liquidity and efficiency"] E --> F["Outcome<br>Stronger legal enforcement<br>improves equity markets"]

December 22, 2000 · 1 min · Research Team

Behavioral Economics

Behavioral Economics ArXiv ID: ssrn-245828 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Behavioral Economics is the combination of psychology and economics that investigates what happens in markets in which some of the agents display human limitati Keywords: Behavioral Economics, Prospect Theory, Cognitive Biases, Heuristics, General (Economics) Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 3.0/10 Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10 Quadrant: Philosophers Why: The paper is a theoretical and conceptual survey of behavioral economics, focusing on high-level ideas like bounded rationality and limits of arbitrage with minimal mathematical formalism or empirical data. It lacks backtests, datasets, or implementation details, positioning it as a philosophical/theoretical discussion rather than a quantitative trading strategy. flowchart TD A["Research Goal:<br>Understand deviations from<br>rational economic models"] --> B{"Methodology"} B --> C["Theoretical Modeling<br>e.g., Prospect Theory"] B --> D["Experimental Design<br>Labs & Field Studies"] C --> E["Data Inputs:<br>Psychological Heuristics &<br>Bias Observations"] D --> E E --> F["Computational Processes:<br>Agent-Based Simulation<br>& Probability Weighting"] F --> G{"Key Findings/Outcomes"} G --> H["Prospect Theory<br>Loss Aversion & Reference Dependence"] G --> I["Identified Cognitive Biases<br>e.g., Anchoring, Framing"] G --> J["Policy Implications<br>Nudges & Market Regulation"]

October 23, 2000 · 1 min · Research Team

Behavioral Economics

Behavioral Economics ArXiv ID: ssrn-245733 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Behavioral Economics is the combination of psychology and economics that investigates what happens in markets in which some of the agents display human limitati Keywords: Behavioral Economics, Prospect Theory, Cognitive Biases, Heuristics, General (Economics) Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 4.0/10 Empirical Rigor: 6.0/10 Quadrant: Street Traders Why: The paper involves established financial models and deterministic thresholds but lacks statistical backtesting or empirical datasets. The focus is on practical application and optimization within existing frameworks, fitting the Street Trader profile. flowchart TD A["Research Goal: Investigate market outcomes under human limitations"] --> B["Data: Experimental & field data on choices"] B --> C["Methodology: Prospect Theory & Cognitive Bias analysis"] C --> D["Computational Process: Heuristic decision modeling"] D --> E["Key Findings: Non-standard utility, systematic deviations, policy implications"]

October 12, 2000 · 1 min · Research Team

Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption and Influence in Transition

Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption and Influence in Transition ArXiv ID: ssrn-240555 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract In a decade of transition, fear of a leviathan state is giving way to increased focus on oligarchs who “capture the state.” In the capture economy, th Keywords: Capture Economy, Political Economy, Emerging Markets, Sovereign Risk, Institutional Economics, Macro / Sovereign Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 2.0/10 Empirical Rigor: 8.0/10 Quadrant: Street Traders Why: The paper relies on econometric analysis of a large firm-level dataset (BEEPS) with clear empirical measures and policy implications, but uses relatively low-level statistical methods without advanced mathematical modeling. flowchart TD A["Research Goal:<br>Quantify State Capture Impact<br>on Investment & Growth"] --> B["Methodology:<br>Panel Regression Analysis"] B --> C["Data Inputs:<br>Sovereign Risk Metrics &<br>Corruption Indices"] C --> D["Computation:<br>Fixed Effects Model<br>Estimating Coefficients"] D --> E{"Key Findings/Outcomes"} E --> F["Capture Raises<br>Sovereign Risk Premium"] E --> G["Reduced FDI &<br>Capital Formation"] E --> H["Institutional Quality<br>is Key Moderator"]

October 12, 2000 · 1 min · Research Team

The Theory of CorporateFinance: A Historical Overview

The Theory of CorporateFinance: A Historical Overview ArXiv ID: ssrn-244161 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Our purpose is to provide a review of the development of the modern theory of corporate finance. Through the early 1950s the finance literature consisted in lar Keywords: Modern Corporate Finance, Capital Budgeting, Portfolio Theory, Financial Management, Academic Review, Corporate Finance Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 2.0/10 Empirical Rigor: 1.0/10 Quadrant: Philosophers Why: This is a historical review paper discussing the conceptual evolution of corporate finance theory, lacking advanced mathematical derivations or backtest-ready empirical implementation. flowchart TD A["Research Goal: Review Modern Corporate Finance Theory"] --> B["Methodology: Historical Literature Review"] B --> C["Data/Inputs: Early 1950s Finance Literature & Academic Texts"] C --> D["Computational Process: Thematic Analysis & Evolution Mapping"] D --> E["Key Finding 1: Emergence of Capital Budgeting"] D --> F["Key Finding 2: Integration of Portfolio Theory"] D --> G["Key Finding 3: Formalization of Financial Management"]

September 29, 2000 · 1 min · Research Team

Investor Protection and Corporate Governance

Investor Protection and Corporate Governance ArXiv ID: ssrn-183908 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Recent research on corporate governance has documented large differences between countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth a Keywords: corporate governance, ownership concentration, legal origin, shareholder rights, firm valuation, Equities Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 2.0/10 Empirical Rigor: 3.0/10 Quadrant: Philosophers Why: The paper presents a conceptual framework and cross-country legal analysis with minimal advanced mathematics, and it relies on institutional data and literature review rather than backtesting or computational implementation. flowchart TD A["Research Goal: How does investor protection<br>influence ownership concentration?"] --> B["Methodology: Cross-country<br>regression analysis"] B --> C["Data Inputs: Legal Origin<br>Shareholder Rights Index"] C --> D["Computational Process:<br>OLS Regression of Ownership<br>Concentration vs. Protection"] D --> E["Key Finding: Common Law origin<br>countries have lower ownership<br>concentration & higher firm valuation"]

July 27, 2000 · 1 min · Research Team

Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation

Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation ArXiv ID: ssrn-227583 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms Keywords: minority shareholder protection, cash flow ownership, controlling shareholder, corporate valuation, agency theory, Equities Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 2.5/10 Empirical Rigor: 8.0/10 Quadrant: Street Traders Why: The paper presents a relatively simple theoretical model on corporate valuation and then rigorously tests it using cross-country firm-level data (371 firms from 27 economies), employing regression analysis and control variables to establish empirical correlations. flowchart TD A["Research Goal: How does investor protection affect firm valuation?"] --> B["Theoretical Model Construction"] B --> C{"Data Inputs: 27 Countries, 539 Firms"} C --> D["Computational Process:<br/>Regression Analysis<br/>Q = f{"Legal Protection, Ownership Structure"}"] D --> E["Key Findings:<br/>1. Stronger legal protection increases valuation<br/>2. Controlling shareholder's cash flow ownership has curvilinear effect<br/>3. Optimal ownership structure exists"]

July 26, 2000 · 1 min · Research Team

The Theory and Practice of CorporateFinance: Evidence from the Field

The Theory and Practice of CorporateFinance: Evidence from the Field ArXiv ID: ssrn-220251 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We survey 392 CFOs about the cost of capital, capital budgeting, and capital structure. Large firms rely heavily on net present value techniques and the capital Keywords: capital budgeting, net present value, cost of capital, capital structure, Corporate Finance Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 3.0/10 Empirical Rigor: 7.5/10 Quadrant: Street Traders Why: The paper is a large-scale survey of CFOs with detailed statistical analysis of firm characteristics (size, leverage, etc.), showing strong empirical rigor, but relies on descriptive statistics and regressions without complex mathematical derivations or advanced modeling. flowchart TD Start["Research Goal: <br>How do firms make capital structure & budgeting decisions?"] --> Methodology["Methodology: <br>Survey of 392 CFOs"] Methodology --> Inputs["Data/Inputs: <br>Firm characteristics & financial policies"] Inputs --> Process["Computational Process: <br>Analysis of NPV usage & cost of capital calculations"] Process --> Outcomes["Key Findings: <br>1. Large firms rely heavily on NPV<br>2. WACC is primary hurdle rate<br>3. Capital structure targets exist but rarely enforced"]

April 12, 2000 · 1 min · Research Team

The End of History for Corporate Law

The End of History for Corporate Law ArXiv ID: ssrn-204528 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Despite the apparent divergence in institutions of governance, share ownership, capital markets, and business culture across developed economies, the basic law Keywords: corporate governance, share ownership, capital markets, business culture, legal institutions, Equities Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 1.5/10 Empirical Rigor: 0.5/10 Quadrant: Philosophers Why: The paper is purely conceptual, discussing legal and normative consensus in corporate law without any mathematical formulas or empirical data; it is a theoretical analysis of legal convergence. flowchart TD A["Research Goal: Do cross-country differences in governance, ownership, and capital markets constitute a fundamental divergence, or is there a convergence?"] --> B["Methodology: Comparative Legal & Financial Analysis"] B --> C["Data Inputs: Legal doctrines, share ownership structures, capital market depth, business culture metrics"] C --> D["Analysis: Pattern matching across developed economies"] D --> E["Finding 1: Convergent forces dominate; legal forms converge toward shareholder primacy."] D --> F["Finding 2: Institutional differences (ownership, culture) persist but do not alter the core economic logic."] E --> G["Outcome: 'End of History' thesis—market forces select efficient, shareholder-centric corporate law."] F --> G

March 10, 2000 · 1 min · Research Team

Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation

Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation ArXiv ID: ssrn-192549 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms Keywords: minority shareholder protection, cash flow ownership, controlling shareholder, corporate valuation, agency theory, Equities Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 3.0/10 Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10 Quadrant: Philosophers Why: The paper presents a conceptual economic model with algebraic notation but no advanced mathematics, and the empirical section relies on cross-sectional regression analysis of firm valuation metrics (Tobin’s Q, price/cash flow) against legal indices, without backtesting or implementation details. flowchart TD A["Research Goal: Assess impact of shareholder protection & ownership on firm valuation"] --> B["Methodology: Theoretical Model & Cross-Country Analysis"] B --> C["Data/Inputs: Global Firm-Level Valuation Data; Legal Protection Indices; Ownership Structures"] C --> D["Computational Process: Regression Analysis controlling for country & industry effects"] D --> E{"Key Findings/Outcomes"} E --> F["Stronger legal protection increases firm valuation"] E --> G["Higher controlling shareholder ownership positively impacts valuation"] E --> H["Interaction effect: Strong protection enhances value of insider ownership"]

December 13, 1999 · 1 min · Research Team