Agency Theory

Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms’ Market Values? Evidence from Korea ArXiv ID: ssrn-2094729 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We report strong OLS and instrumental variable evidence that an overall corporate governance index is an important and likely causal factor in explaining Keywords: corporate governance, OLS regression, instrumental variables, firm performance, agency theory, Equities (Corporate Governance) Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 2.5/10 Empirical Rigor: 7.0/10 Quadrant: Street Traders Why: The paper relies on standard econometric techniques (OLS, 2SLS) with accessible interpretation (Tobin’s q, t-stats) rather than dense mathematical theory, but demonstrates strong empirical rigor through a large dataset, instrumental variables exploiting a natural experiment (regulatory threshold), and robustness checks. flowchart TD A["Research Goal<br>Does Corporate Governance<br>Predict Firm Market Value?"] --> B["Data Source<br>Korean Stock Market Data"] B --> C["Key Methodology<br>OLS & Instrumental Variables IV"] C --> D["Computational Process<br>Regressing Firm Value on<br>Corporate Governance Index"] D --> E{"Key Finding"} E --> F["Strong Causal Evidence<br>Corporate Governance<br>Significantly Predicts Market Value"]

Behavioral Corporate Finance: A Survey ArXiv ID: ssrn-1294473 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Research in behavioral corporate finance takes two distinct approaches. The first emphasizes that investors are less than fully rational. It views managerial fi Keywords: behavioral finance, corporate finance, irrational investors, managerial decision-making, agency theory, Corporate Equity Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 2.0/10 Empirical Rigor: 1.5/10 Quadrant: Philosophers Why: The paper is a survey of theoretical models and empirical challenges in behavioral corporate finance, with no original mathematical derivations or backtesting, relying instead on conceptual frameworks and literature review. flowchart TD A["Research Goal: Investigate how behavioral biases affect corporate financial decisions"] --> B{"Methodology: Literature Review & Theoretical Framework"} B --> C["Data: Empirical studies on market anomalies & managerial actions"] C --> D["Process: Analyze Investor Irrationality & Managerial Decision-Making"] D --> E["Outcomes: Integrated Model of Behavioral Corporate Finance"] E --> F["Key Findings: Biases influence equity issuance, M&A, & CEO compensation"]

Corporate Governance in India - Evolution and Challenges ArXiv ID: ssrn-649857 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract While recent high-profile corporate governance failures in developed countries have brought the subject to media attention, the issue has always been central to Keywords: corporate governance, agency theory, board independence, executive compensation, shareholder rights, Equities Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 0.5/10 Empirical Rigor: 1.0/10 Quadrant: Philosophers Why: The paper is a descriptive, qualitative review of corporate governance history and challenges in India, using citations from existing literature rather than presenting original mathematical models, simulations, or backtest-ready data. flowchart TD RQ["Research Question: How has corporate governance in India evolved and what are its key contemporary challenges?"] MET["Methodology: Systematic Literature Review & Conceptual Analysis"] DATA["Data Inputs: Academic papers, policy documents, corporate reports, high-profile case studies"] COMP["Computational Process: Thematic analysis of governance mechanisms and synthesis of challenges"] FIND["Key Findings: Evolution from owner-centric to regulated governance; persistent challenges in board independence, shareholder rights, and executive compensation"] RQ --> MET --> DATA --> COMP --> FIND

Behavioral Corporate Finance: A Survey ArXiv ID: ssrn-612064 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Research in behavioral corporate finance takes two distinct approaches. The first emphasizes that investors are less than fully rational. It views managerial fi Keywords: behavioral finance, corporate finance, irrational investors, managerial decision-making, agency theory, Corporate Equity Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 3.0/10 Empirical Rigor: 4.0/10 Quadrant: Philosophers Why: The paper is a theoretical survey of behavioral corporate finance, discussing models of investor and manager irrationality with conceptual frameworks rather than dense mathematical derivations, and while it references empirical challenges and evidence, it does not present new backtests or implementation-heavy data analysis. flowchart TD A["Research Goal:<br/>Understand biases in corporate finance"] --> B["Data/Inputs:<br/>Capital structure, equity issuance,<br/>compensation data"] B --> C["Methodology Step 1:<br/>Investor Irrationality Approach"] B --> D["Methodology Step 2:<br/>Managerial Bias Approach"] C --> E{"Computational Process:<br/>Analyze market mispricing<br/>and timing effects"} D --> E E --> F["Key Findings/Outcomes:<br/>Market timing & biased<br/>corporate decisions"]

Behavioral CorporateFinance: A Survey ArXiv ID: ssrn-602902 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Research in behavioral corporate finance takes two distinct approaches. The first emphasizes that investors are less than fully rational. It views managerial fi Keywords: behavioral finance, corporate finance, irrational investors, managerial decision-making, agency theory, Corporate Equity Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 4.0/10 Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10 Quadrant: Philosophers Why: The paper is a survey of theoretical models and empirical challenges in behavioral corporate finance, featuring conceptual frameworks and literature review rather than dense mathematical derivations or new backtested strategies. Empirical evidence is discussed but not presented with implementation-heavy data or quantitative results. flowchart TD A["Research Goal:<br>Understand Behavioral Biases in<br>Corporate Finance Decisions"] --> B{"Key Methodologies"} B --> C["Investor-Level Analysis<br>(Less than Fully Rational)"] B --> D["Manager-Level Analysis<br>(Psychological Biases)"] C --> E["Data/Inputs:<br>Market Anomalies<br>Pricing Errors"] D --> F["Data/Inputs:<br>Financial Statements<br>Corporate Events"] E --> G["Computational Process:<br>Market Efficiency Tests<br>Asset Pricing Models"] F --> H["Computational Process:<br>Agency Theory Models<br>Decision Frameworks"] G --> I["Key Findings:<br>Investor irrationality drives<br>market mispricing"] H --> J["Key Findings:<br>Managerial biases affect<br>capital structure & M&A"] I --> K{"Outcome:<br>Integrated Behavioral<br>Corporate Finance Framework"} J --> K

Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation ArXiv ID: ssrn-313475 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms Keywords: minority shareholder protection, cash flow ownership, controlling shareholder, corporate valuation, agency theory, Equities Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 4.5/10 Empirical Rigor: 3.0/10 Quadrant: Philosophers Why: The paper is a theoretical corporate finance model with standard optimization and equilibrium derivation, scoring moderate math complexity, but lacks code, backtests, or detailed empirical data implementation, resulting in low empirical rigor. flowchart TD A["Research Goal: How do minority shareholder protection and cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder affect corporate valuation?"] --> B["Methodology: Theoretical Model Development"] B --> C["Data Inputs: Firm-level valuation metrics, Legal protection indices, Ownership concentration data"] C --> D["Computational Process: Regression analysis and equilibrium modeling of agency costs"] D --> E["Key Findings: Stronger legal protection and higher controlling ownership increase firm valuation, but effects interact nonlinearly"]

Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation ArXiv ID: ssrn-227583 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms Keywords: minority shareholder protection, cash flow ownership, controlling shareholder, corporate valuation, agency theory, Equities Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 2.5/10 Empirical Rigor: 8.0/10 Quadrant: Street Traders Why: The paper presents a relatively simple theoretical model on corporate valuation and then rigorously tests it using cross-country firm-level data (371 firms from 27 economies), employing regression analysis and control variables to establish empirical correlations. flowchart TD A["Research Goal: How does investor protection affect firm valuation?"] --> B["Theoretical Model Construction"] B --> C{"Data Inputs: 27 Countries, 539 Firms"} C --> D["Computational Process:<br/>Regression Analysis<br/>Q = f{"Legal Protection, Ownership Structure"}"] D --> E["Key Findings:<br/>1. Stronger legal protection increases valuation<br/>2. Controlling shareholder's cash flow ownership has curvilinear effect<br/>3. Optimal ownership structure exists"]

Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation ArXiv ID: ssrn-192549 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms Keywords: minority shareholder protection, cash flow ownership, controlling shareholder, corporate valuation, agency theory, Equities Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 3.0/10 Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10 Quadrant: Philosophers Why: The paper presents a conceptual economic model with algebraic notation but no advanced mathematics, and the empirical section relies on cross-sectional regression analysis of firm valuation metrics (Tobin’s Q, price/cash flow) against legal indices, without backtesting or implementation details. flowchart TD A["Research Goal: Assess impact of shareholder protection & ownership on firm valuation"] --> B["Methodology: Theoretical Model & Cross-Country Analysis"] B --> C["Data/Inputs: Global Firm-Level Valuation Data; Legal Protection Indices; Ownership Structures"] C --> D["Computational Process: Regression Analysis controlling for country & industry effects"] D --> E{"Key Findings/Outcomes"} E --> F["Stronger legal protection increases firm valuation"] E --> G["Higher controlling shareholder ownership positively impacts valuation"] E --> H["Interaction effect: Strong protection enhances value of insider ownership"]