Arbitrage

Impermanent loss and Loss-vs-Rebalancing II ArXiv ID: 2502.04097 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract This paper examines the relationship between impermanent loss (IL) and loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR) in automated market makers (AMMs). Our main focus is on statistical properties, the impact of fees, the role of block times, and, related to the latter, the continuous time limit. We find there are three relevant regimes: (i) very short times where LVR and IL are identical; (ii) intermediate time where LVR and IL show distinct distribution functions but are connected via the central limit theorem exhibiting the same expectation value; (iii) long time behavior where both the distribution functions and averages are distinct. Subsequently, we study how fees change this dynamics with a special focus on competing time scales like block times and ‘arbitrage times’. ...

Loss-Versus-Fair: Efficiency of Dutch Auctions on Blockchains ArXiv ID: 2406.00113 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Milionis et al.(2023) studied the rate at which automated market makers leak value to arbitrageurs when block times are discrete and follow a Poisson process, and where the risky asset price follows a geometric Brownian motion. We extend their model to analyze another popular mechanism in decentralized finance for onchain trading: Dutch auctions. We compute the expected losses that a seller incurs to arbitrageurs and expected time-to-fill for Dutch auctions as a function of starting price, volatility, decay rate, and average interblock time. We also extend the analysis to gradual Dutch auctions, a variation on Dutch auctions for selling tokens over time at a continuous rate. We use these models to explore the tradeoff between speed of execution and quality of execution, which could help inform practitioners in setting parameters for starting price and decay rate on Dutch auctions, or help platform designers determine performance parameters like block times. ...

Growth rate of liquidity provider’s wealth in G3Ms ArXiv ID: 2403.18177 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We study how trading fees and continuous-time arbitrage affect the profitability of liquidity providers (LPs) in Geometric Mean Market Makers (G3Ms). We use stochastic reflected diffusion processes to analyze the dynamics of a G3M model under the arbitrage-driven market. Our research focuses on calculating LP wealth and extends the findings of Tassy and White related to the constant product market maker (Uniswap v2) to a wider range of G3Ms, including Balancer. This allows us to calculate the long-term expected logarithmic growth of LP wealth, offering new insights into the complex dynamics of AMMs and their implications for LPs in decentralized finance. ...

am-AMM: An Auction-Managed Automated Market Maker ArXiv ID: 2403.03367 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Automated market makers (AMMs) have emerged as the dominant market mechanism for trading on decentralized exchanges implemented on blockchains. This paper presents a single mechanism that targets two important unsolved problems for AMMs: reducing losses to informed orderflow, and maximizing revenue from uninformed orderflow. The auction-managed AMM'' works by running a censorship-resistant onchain auction for the right to temporarily act as pool manager’’ for a constant-product AMM. The pool manager sets the swap fee rate on the pool, and also receives the accrued fees from swaps. The pool manager can exclusively capture some arbitrage by trading against the pool in response to small price movements, and also can set swap fees incorporating price sensitivity of retail orderflow and adapting to changing market conditions, with the benefits from both ultimately accruing to liquidity providers. Liquidity providers can enter and exit the pool freely in response to changing rent, though they must pay a small fee on withdrawal. We prove that under certain assumptions, this AMM should have higher liquidity in equilibrium than any standard, fixed-fee AMM. ...

Closed-form solutions for generic N-token AMM arbitrage ArXiv ID: 2402.06731 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Convex optimisation has provided a mechanism to determine arbitrage trades on automated market markets (AMMs) since almost their inception. Here we outline generic closed-form solutions for $N$-token geometric mean market maker pool arbitrage, that in simulation (with synthetic and historic data) provide better arbitrage opportunities than convex optimisers and is able to capitalise on those opportunities sooner. Furthermore, the intrinsic parallelism of the proposed approach (unlike convex optimisation) offers the ability to scale on GPUs, opening up a new approach to AMM modelling by offering an alternative to numerical-solver-based methods. The lower computational cost of running this new mechanism can also enable on-chain arbitrage bots for multi-asset pools. ...

High order universal portfolios ArXiv ID: 2311.13564 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract The Cover universal portfolio (UP from now on) has many interesting theoretical and numerical properties and was investigated for a long time. Building on it, we explore what happens when we add this UP to the market as a new synthetic asset and construct by recurrence higher order UPs. We investigate some important theoretical properties of the high order UPs and show in particular that they are indeed different from the Cover UP and are capable to break the time permutation invariance. We show that under some perturbation regime the second high order UP has better Sharp ratio than the standard UP and briefly investigate arbitrage opportunities thus created. Numerical experiences on a benchmark from the literature confirm that high order UPs improve Cover’s UP performances. ...

Reconciling Open Interest with Traded Volume in Perpetual Swaps ArXiv ID: 2310.14973 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Perpetual swaps are derivative contracts that allow traders to speculate on, or hedge, the price movements of cryptocurrencies. Unlike futures contracts, perpetual swaps have no settlement or expiration in the traditional sense. The funding rate acts as the mechanism that tethers the perpetual swap to its underlying with the help of arbitrageurs. Open interest, in the context of perpetual swaps and derivative contracts in general, refers to the total number of outstanding contracts at a given point in time. It is a critical metric in derivatives markets as it can provide insight into market activity, sentiment and overall liquidity. It also provides a way to estimate a lower bound on the collateral required for every cryptocurrency market on an exchange. This number, cumulated across all markets on the exchange in combination with proof of reserves, can be used to gauge whether the exchange in question operates with unsustainable levels of leverage, which could have solvency implications. We find that open interest in Bitcoin perpetual swaps is systematically misquoted by some of the largest derivatives exchanges; however, the degree varies, with some exchanges reporting open interest that is wholly implausible to others that seem to be delaying messages of forced trades, i.e., liquidations. We identify these incongruities by analyzing tick-by-tick data for two time periods in $2023$ by connecting directly to seven of the most liquid cryptocurrency derivatives exchanges. ...

All AMMs are CFMMs. All DeFi markets have invariants. A DeFi market is arbitrage-free if and only if it has an increasing invariant ArXiv ID: 2310.09782 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract In a universal framework that expresses any market system in terms of state transition rules, we prove that every DeFi market system has an invariant function and is thus by definition a CFMM; indeed, all automated market makers (AMMs) are CFMMs. Invariants connect directly to arbitrage and to completeness, according to two fundamental equivalences. First, a DeFi market system is, we prove, arbitrage-free if and only if it has a strictly increasing invariant, where arbitrage-free means that no state can be transformed into a dominated state by any sequence of transactions. Second, the invariant is, we prove, unique if and only if the market system is complete, meaning that it allows transitions between all pairs of states in the state space, in at least one direction. Thus a necessary and sufficient condition for no-arbitrage (respectively, for completeness) is the existence of the increasing (respectively, the uniqueness of the) invariant, which, therefore, fulfills in nonlinear DeFi theory the foundational role parallel to the existence (respectively, uniqueness) of the pricing measure in the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing for linear markets. Moreover, a market system is recoverable by its invariant if and only if it is complete; and in all cases, complete or incomplete, every market system has, and is recoverable by, a multi-invariant. A market system is arbitrage-free if and only if its multi-invariant is increasing. Our examples illustrate (non)existence of various specific types of arbitrage in the context of various specific types of market systems – with or without fees, with or without liquidity operations, and with or without coordination among multiple pools – but the fundamental theorems have full generality, applicable to any DeFi market system and to any notion of arbitrage expressible as a strict partial order. ...

UAMM: Price-oracle based Automated Market Maker ArXiv ID: 2308.06375 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Automated market makers (AMMs) are pricing mechanisms utilized by decentralized exchanges (DEX). Traditional AMM approaches are constrained by pricing solely based on their own liquidity pool, without consideration of external markets or risk management for liquidity providers. In this paper, we propose a new approach known as UBET AMM (UAMM), which calculates prices by considering external market prices and the impermanent loss of the liquidity pool. Despite relying on external market prices, our method maintains the desired properties of a constant product curve when computing slippages. The key element of UAMM is determining the appropriate slippage amount based on the desired target balance, which encourages the liquidity pool to minimize impermanent loss. We demonstrate that our approach eliminates arbitrage opportunities when external market prices are efficient. ...

Automated Market Making and Arbitrage Profits in the Presence of Fees ArXiv ID: 2305.14604 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We consider the impact of trading fees on the profits of arbitrageurs trading against an automated market maker (AMM) or, equivalently, on the adverse selection incurred by liquidity providers (LPs) due to arbitrage. We extend the model of Milionis et al. [“2022”] for a general class of two asset AMMs to introduce both fees and discrete Poisson block generation times. In our setting, we are able to compute the expected instantaneous rate of arbitrage profit in closed form. When the fees are low, in the fast block asymptotic regime, the impact of fees takes a particularly simple form: fees simply scale down arbitrage profits by the fraction of blocks which present profitable trading opportunities to arbitrageurs. This fraction decreases with an increasing block rate, hence our model yields an important practical insight: faster blockchains will result in reduced LP losses. Further introducing gas fees (fixed costs) in our model, we show that, in the fast block asymptotic regime, lower gas fees lead to smaller losses for LPs. ...