Automated Market Maker

What Drives Liquidity on Decentralized Exchanges? Evidence from the Uniswap Protocol ArXiv ID: 2410.19107 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We study liquidity on decentralized exchanges (DEXs), identifying factors at the platform, blockchain, token pair, and liquidity pool levels with predictive power for market depth metrics. We introduce the v2 counterfactual spread metric, a novel criterion which assesses the degree of liquidity concentration in pools using the ``concentrated liquidity’’ mechanism, allowing us to decompose the effect of a factor on market depth into two channels: total value locked (TVL) and concentration. We further explore how external liquidity from competing DEXs and private inventory on DEX aggregators influence market depth. We find that (i) gas prices, returns, and a DEX’s share of trading volume affect liquidity through concentration, (ii) internalization of order flow by private market makers affects TVL but not the overall market depth, and (iii) volatility, fee revenue, and markout affect liquidity through both channels. ...

Concentrated Liquidity with Leverage ArXiv ID: 2409.12803 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Concentrated liquidity (CL) provisioning is a way how to improve the capital efficiency of Automated Market Makers (AMM). Allowing liquidity providers to use leverage is a step towards even higher capital efficiency. A number of Decentralized Finance (DeFi) protocols implement this technique in conjunction with overcollateralized lending. However, the properties of leveraged CL positions have not been formalized and are poorly understood in practice. This article describes the principles of a leveraged CL provisioning protocol, formally models the notions of margin level, assets, and debt, and proves that within this model, leveraged LP positions possess several properties that make them safe to use. ...

No Questions Asked: Effects of Transparency on Stablecoin Liquidity During the Collapse of Silicon Valley Bank ArXiv ID: 2407.11716 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Fiat-pegged stablecoins are by nature exposed to spillover effects during market turmoil in Traditional Finance (TradFi). We observe a difference in TradFi market shocks impact between various stablecoins, in particular, USD Coin (USDC) and Tether USDT (USDT), the former with a higher reporting frequency and transparency than the latter. We investigate this, using top USDC and USDT liquidity pools in Uniswap, by adapting the Marginal Cost of Immediacy (MCI) measure to Uniswap’s Automated Market Maker, and then conducting Difference-in-Differences analysis on MCI and Total Value Locked (TVL) in USD, as well as measuring liquidity concentration across different providers. Results show that the Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) event reduced USDC’s TVL dominance over USDT, increased USDT’s liquidity cost relative to USDC, and liquidity provision remained concentrated with pool-specific trends. These findings reveal a flight-to-safety behavior and counterintuitive effects of stablecoin transparency: USDC’s frequent and detailed disclosures led to swift market reactions, while USDT’s opacity and less frequent reporting provided a safety net against immediate impacts. ...

Layer 2 be or Layer not 2 be: Scaling on Uniswap v3 ArXiv ID: 2403.09494 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract This paper studies the market structure impact of cheaper and faster chains on the Uniswap v3 Protocol. The Uniswap Protocol is the largest decentralized application on Ethereum by both gas and blockspace used, and user behaviors of the protocol are very sensitive to fluctuations in gas prices and market structure due to the economic factors of the Protocol. We focus on the chains where Uniswap v3 has the most activity, giving us the best comparison to Ethereum mainnet. Because of cheaper gas and lower block times, we find evidence that the majority of swaps get better gas-adjusted execution on these chains, liquidity providers are more capital efficient, and liquidity providers have increased fee returns from more arbitrage. We also present evidence that two second block times may be too long for optimal liquidity provider returns, compared to first come, first served. We argue that many of the current drawbacks with AMMs may be due to chain dynamics and are vastly improved with cheaper and faster transactions ...

Expiring Assets in Automated Market Makers ArXiv ID: 2401.04289 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract An automated market maker (AMM) is a state machine that manages pools of assets, allowing parties to buy and sell those assets according to a fixed mathematical formula. AMMs are typically implemented as smart contracts on blockchains, and its prices are kept in line with the overall market price by arbitrage: if the AMM undervalues an asset with respect to the market, an “arbitrageur” can make a risk-free profit by buying just enough of that asset to bring the AMM’s price back in line with the market. AMMs, however, are not designed for assets that expire: that is, assets that cannot be produced or resold after a specified date. As assets approach expiration, arbitrage may not be able to reconcile supply and demand, and the liquidity providers that funded the AMM may have excessive exposure to risk due to rapid price variations. This paper formally describes the design of a decentralized exchange (DEX) for assets that expire, combining aspects of AMMs and limit-order books. We ensure liveness and market clearance, providing mechanisms for liquidity providers to control their exposure to risk and adjust prices dynamically in response to situations where arbitrage may fail. ...