Automated Market Maker (AMM)

Concentrated Superelliptical Market Maker ArXiv ID: 2410.13265 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract An automated market maker where the price can cross the zero bound into the negative price domain with applications in electricity, energy, and derivatives markets is presented. A unique feature involves the ability to swap both negatively and positively priced assets between one another, which unlike traditional markets requires a numeraire in the form of a currency. Model extensions to skew and concentrate liquidity are shown. The liquidity fingerprint, payoff, and invariant are compared to the Black-Scholes covered call and the Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule invariants. ...

CLVR Ordering of Transactions on AMMs ArXiv ID: 2408.02634 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract This paper introduces a trade ordering rule that aims to reduce intra-block price volatility in Automated Market Maker (AMM) powered decentralized exchanges. The ordering rule introduced here, Clever Look-ahead Volatility Reduction (CLVR), operates under the (common) framework in decentralized finance that allows some entities to observe trade requests before they are settled, assemble them into “blocks”, and order them as they like. On AMM exchanges, asset prices are continuously and transparently updated as a result of each trade and therefore, transaction order has high financial value. CLVR aims to order transactions for traders’ benefit. Our primary focus is intra-block price stability (minimizing volatility), which has two main benefits for traders: it reduces transaction failure rate and allows traders to receive closer prices to the reference price at which they submit their transactions accordingly. We show that CLVR constructs an ordering which approximately minimizes price volatility with a small computation cost and can be trivially verified externally. ...

Automated Market Making and Decentralized Finance ArXiv ID: 2407.16885 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Automated market makers (AMMs) are a new type of trading venues which are revolutionising the way market participants interact. At present, the majority of AMMs are constant function market makers (CFMMs) where a deterministic trading function determines how markets are cleared. Within CFMMs, we focus on constant product market makers (CPMMs) which implements the concentrated liquidity (CL) feature. In this thesis we formalise and study the trading mechanism of CPMMs with CL, and we develop liquidity provision and liquidity taking strategies. Our models are motivated and tested with market data. We derive optimal strategies for liquidity takers (LTs) who trade orders of large size and execute statistical arbitrages. First, we consider an LT who trades in a CPMM with CL and uses the dynamics of prices in competing venues as market signals. We use Uniswap v3 data to study price, liquidity, and trading cost dynamics, and to motivate the model. Next, we consider an LT who trades a basket of crypto-currencies whose constituents co-move. We use market data to study lead-lag effects, spillover effects, and causality between trading venues. We derive optimal strategies for strategic liquidity providers (LPs) who provide liquidity in CPMM with CL. First, we use stochastic control tools to derive a self-financing and closed-form optimal liquidity provision strategy where the width of the LP’s liquidity range is determined by the profitability of the pool, the dynamics of the LP’s position, and concentration risk. Next, we use a model-free approach to solve the problem of an LP who provides liquidity in multiple CPMMs with CL. We do not specify a model for the stochastic processes observed by LPs, and use a long short-term memory (LSTM) neural network to approximate the optimal liquidity provision strategy. ...

Adaptive Curves for Optimally Efficient Market Making ArXiv ID: 2406.13794 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are essential in Decentralized Finance (DeFi) as they match liquidity supply with demand. They function through liquidity providers (LPs) who deposit assets into liquidity pools. However, the asset trading prices in these pools often trail behind those in more dynamic, centralized exchanges, leading to potential arbitrage losses for LPs. This issue is tackled by adapting market maker bonding curves to trader behavior, based on the classical market microstructure model of Glosten and Milgrom. Our approach ensures a zero-profit condition for the market maker’s prices. We derive the differential equation that an optimal adaptive curve should follow to minimize arbitrage losses while remaining competitive. Solutions to this optimality equation are obtained for standard Gaussian and Lognormal price models using Kalman filtering. A key feature of our method is its ability to estimate the external market price without relying on price or loss oracles. We also provide an equivalent differential equation for the implied dynamics of canonical static bonding curves and establish conditions for their optimality. Our algorithms demonstrate robustness to changing market conditions and adversarial perturbations, and we offer an on-chain implementation using Uniswap v4 alongside off-chain AI co-processors. ...

Fees in AMMs: A quantitative study ArXiv ID: 2406.12417 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract In the ever evolving landscape of decentralized finance automated market makers (AMMs) play a key role: they provide a market place for trading assets in a decentralized manner. For so-called bluechip pairs, arbitrage activity provides a major part of the revenue generation of AMMs but also a major source of loss due to the so-called ‘informed orderflow’. Finding ways to minimize those losses while still keeping uninformed trading activity alive is a major problem in the field. In this paper we will investigate the mechanics of said arbitrage and try to understand how AMMs can maximize the revenue creation or in other words minimize the losses. To that end, we model the dynamics of arbitrage activity for a concrete implementation of a pool and study its sensitivity to the choice of fee aiming to maximize the revenue for the AMM. We identify dynamical fees that mimic the directionality of the price due to asymmetric fee choices as a promising avenue to mitigate losses to toxic flow. This work is based on and extends a recent article by some of the authors. ...

A Multi-step Approach for Minimizing Risk in Decentralized Exchanges ArXiv ID: 2406.07200 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Decentralized Exchanges are becoming even more predominant in today’s finance. Driven by the need to study this phenomenon from an academic perspective, the SIAG/FME Code Quest 2023 was announced. Specifically, participating teams were asked to implement, in Python, the basic functions of an Automated Market Maker and a liquidity provision strategy in an Automated Market Maker to minimize the Conditional Value at Risk, a critical measure of investment risk. As the competition’s winning team, we highlight our approach in this work. In particular, as the dependence of the final return on the initial wealth distribution is highly non-linear, we cannot use standard ad-hoc approaches. Additionally, classical minimization techniques would require a significant computational load due to the cost of the target function. For these reasons, we propose a three-step approach. In the first step, the target function is approximated by a Kernel Ridge Regression. Then, the approximating function is minimized. In the final step, the previously discovered minimum is utilized as the starting point for directly optimizing the desired target function. By using this procedure, we can both reduce the computational complexity and increase the accuracy of the solution. Finally, the overall computational load is further reduced thanks to an algorithmic trick concerning the returns simulation and the usage of Cython. ...

am-AMM: An Auction-Managed Automated Market Maker ArXiv ID: 2403.03367 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Automated market makers (AMMs) have emerged as the dominant market mechanism for trading on decentralized exchanges implemented on blockchains. This paper presents a single mechanism that targets two important unsolved problems for AMMs: reducing losses to informed orderflow, and maximizing revenue from uninformed orderflow. The auction-managed AMM'' works by running a censorship-resistant onchain auction for the right to temporarily act as pool manager’’ for a constant-product AMM. The pool manager sets the swap fee rate on the pool, and also receives the accrued fees from swaps. The pool manager can exclusively capture some arbitrage by trading against the pool in response to small price movements, and also can set swap fees incorporating price sensitivity of retail orderflow and adapting to changing market conditions, with the benefits from both ultimately accruing to liquidity providers. Liquidity providers can enter and exit the pool freely in response to changing rent, though they must pay a small fee on withdrawal. We prove that under certain assumptions, this AMM should have higher liquidity in equilibrium than any standard, fixed-fee AMM. ...

Optimal Automated Market Makers: Differentiable Economics and Strong Duality ArXiv ID: 2402.09129 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract The role of a market maker is to simultaneously offer to buy and sell quantities of goods, often a financial asset such as a share, at specified prices. An automated market maker (AMM) is a mechanism that offers to trade according to some predetermined schedule; the best choice of this schedule depends on the market maker’s goals. The literature on the design of AMMs has mainly focused on prediction markets with the goal of information elicitation. More recent work motivated by DeFi has focused instead on the goal of profit maximization, but considering only a single type of good (traded with a numeraire), including under adverse selection (Milionis et al. 2022). Optimal market making in the presence of multiple goods, including the possibility of complex bundling behavior, is not well understood. In this paper, we show that finding an optimal market maker is dual to an optimal transport problem, with specific geometric constraints on the transport plan in the dual. We show that optimal mechanisms for multiple goods and under adverse selection can take advantage of bundling, both improved prices for bundled purchases and sales as well as sometimes accepting payment “in kind.” We present conjectures of optimal mechanisms in additional settings which show further complex behavior. From a methodological perspective, we make essential use of the tools of differentiable economics to generate conjectures of optimal mechanisms, and give a proof-of-concept for the use of such tools in guiding theoretical investigations. ...

Closed-form solutions for generic N-token AMM arbitrage ArXiv ID: 2402.06731 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Convex optimisation has provided a mechanism to determine arbitrage trades on automated market markets (AMMs) since almost their inception. Here we outline generic closed-form solutions for $N$-token geometric mean market maker pool arbitrage, that in simulation (with synthetic and historic data) provide better arbitrage opportunities than convex optimisers and is able to capitalise on those opportunities sooner. Furthermore, the intrinsic parallelism of the proposed approach (unlike convex optimisation) offers the ability to scale on GPUs, opening up a new approach to AMM modelling by offering an alternative to numerical-solver-based methods. The lower computational cost of running this new mechanism can also enable on-chain arbitrage bots for multi-asset pools. ...

UAMM: Price-oracle based Automated Market Maker ArXiv ID: 2308.06375 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Automated market makers (AMMs) are pricing mechanisms utilized by decentralized exchanges (DEX). Traditional AMM approaches are constrained by pricing solely based on their own liquidity pool, without consideration of external markets or risk management for liquidity providers. In this paper, we propose a new approach known as UBET AMM (UAMM), which calculates prices by considering external market prices and the impermanent loss of the liquidity pool. Despite relying on external market prices, our method maintains the desired properties of a constant product curve when computing slippages. The key element of UAMM is determining the appropriate slippage amount based on the desired target balance, which encourages the liquidity pool to minimize impermanent loss. We demonstrate that our approach eliminates arbitrage opportunities when external market prices are efficient. ...