Automated Market Makers (AMM)

Design of a Decentralized Fixed-Income Lending Automated Market Maker Protocol Supporting Arbitrary Maturities ArXiv ID: 2512.16080 “View on arXiv” Authors: Tianyi Ma Abstract In decentralized finance (DeFi), designing fixed-income lending automated market makers (AMMs) is extremely challenging due to time-related complexities. Moreover, existing protocols only support single-maturity lending. Building upon the BondMM protocol, this paper argues that its mathematical invariants are sufficiently elegant to be generalized to arbitrary maturities. This paper thus propose an improved design, BondMM-A, which supports lending activities of any maturity. By integrating fixed-income instruments of varying maturities into a single smart contract, BondMM-A offers users and liquidity providers (LPs) greater operational freedom and capital efficiency. Experimental results show that BondMM-A performs excellently in terms of interest rate stability and financial robustness. ...

Concentrated N-dimensional AMM with Polar Coordinates in Rust ArXiv ID: 2510.05428 “View on arXiv” Authors: Vasily Tolstikov, Marcus Wentz, Joseph Schiarizzi, Derek Ding Abstract We expand on the recent development of n-dimensional automated market makers for stablecoins by showing a way to build concentrated liquidity positions with ticks in polar coordinates in Rust, including the featured ability to skew said concentrated liquidity. We highlight the risk of stacking too many stablecoin pools and how to hedge said risk. ...

Automated Market Makers in Cryptoeconomic Systems: A Taxonomy and Archetypes ArXiv ID: 2309.12818 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Designing automated market makers (AMMs) is crucial for decentralized token exchanges in cryptoeconomic systems. At the intersection of software engineering and economics, AMM design is complex and, if done incorrectly, can lead to financial risks and inefficiencies. We developed an AMM taxonomy for systematically comparing AMM designs and propose three AMM archetypes that meet key requirements for token issuance and exchange. This work bridges software engineering and economic perspectives, providing insights to help developers design AMMs tailored to diverse use cases and foster sustainable cryptoeconomic systems. ...

Decentralised Finance and Automated Market Making: Predictable Loss and Optimal Liquidity Provision ArXiv ID: 2309.08431 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Constant product markets with concentrated liquidity (CL) are the most popular type of automated market makers. In this paper, we characterise the continuous-time wealth dynamics of strategic LPs who dynamically adjust their range of liquidity provision in CL pools. Their wealth results from fee income, the value of their holdings in the pool, and rebalancing costs. Next, we derive a self-financing and closed-form optimal liquidity provision strategy where the width of the LP’s liquidity range is determined by the profitability of the pool (provision fees minus gas fees), the predictable losses (PL) of the LP’s position, and concentration risk. Concentration risk refers to the decrease in fee revenue if the marginal exchange rate (akin to the midprice in a limit order book) in the pool exits the LP’s range of liquidity. When the drift in the marginal rate is stochastic, we show how to optimally skew the range of liquidity to increase fee revenue and profit from the expected changes in the marginal rate. Finally, we use Uniswap v3 data to show that, on average, LPs have traded at a significant loss, and to show that the out-of-sample performance of our strategy is superior to the historical performance of LPs in the pool we consider. ...