How and Why Credit Rating Agencies are Not Like Other Gatekeepers
How and Why Credit Rating Agencies are Not Like Other Gatekeepers ArXiv ID: ssrn-900257 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract This article revisits some issues I raised in a 1999 article on credit rating agencies, which increasingly are the focus of scholars and regulators. I discuss h Keywords: Credit Rating Agencies, Regulatory Reform, Information Asymmetry, Credit Risk, Fixed Income Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 1.0/10 Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10 Quadrant: Philosophers Why: The paper is an analytical critique of the credit rating agency business model and regulatory environment, relying on economic theory, legal argument, and historical evidence rather than advanced mathematical modeling or empirical backtesting. flowchart TD A["Research Goal: Why are Credit Rating Agencies unique vs. other gatekeepers?"] --> B["Methodology: Comparative Legal & Economic Analysis"] B --> C["Data: Historical Regulatory Frameworks (1999 vs. Present)"] C --> D["Computational Process: Analyze Information Asymmetry & Liability Structures"] D --> E["Outcome 1: CRA's 'Disseminator' Status (vs. 'Verifier')"] D --> F["Outcome 2: Limited Impact of Standard Liability Regimes"] D --> G["Outcome 3: Unique Regulatory Dependence on CRA Output"]