Decentralized Exchange (DEX)

Second Thoughts: How 1-second subslots transform CEX-DEX Arbitrage on Ethereum ArXiv ID: 2601.00738 “View on arXiv” Authors: Aleksei Adadurov, Sergey Barseghyan, Anton Chtepine, Antero Eloranta, Andrei Sebyakin, Arsenii Valitov Abstract This paper examines the impact of reducing Ethereum slot time on decentralized exchange activity, with a focus on CEX-DEX arbitrage behavior. We develop a trading model where the agent’s DEX transaction is not guaranteed to land, and the agent explicitly accounts for this execution risk when deciding whether to pursue arbitrage opportunities. We compare agent behavior under Ethereum’s default 12-second slot time environment with a faster regime that offers 1-second subslot execution. The simulations, calibrated to Binance and Uniswap v3 data from July to September 2025, show that faster slot times increase arbitrage transaction count by 535% and trading volume by 203% on average. The increase in CEX-DEX arbitrage activity under 1-second subslots is driven by the reduction in variance of both successful and failed trade outcomes, increasing the risk-adjusted returns and making CEX-DEX arbitrage more appealing. ...

Measuring DEX Efficiency and The Effect of an Enhanced Routing Method on Both DEX Efficiency and Stakeholders’ Benefits ArXiv ID: 2508.03217 “View on arXiv” Authors: Yu Zhang, Claudio J. Tessone Abstract The efficiency of decentralized exchanges (DEXs) and the influence of token routing algorithms on market performance and stakeholder outcomes remain underexplored. This paper introduces the concept of Standardized Total Arbitrage Profit (STAP), computed via convex optimization, as a systematic measure of DEX efficiency. We prove that executing the trade order maximizing STAP and reintegrating the resulting transaction fees eliminates all arbitrage opportunities-both cyclic arbitrage within DEXs and between DEXs and centralized exchanges (CEXs). In a fully efficient DEX (i.e., STAP = 0), the monetary value of target tokens received must not exceed that of the source tokens, regardless of the routing algorithm. Any violation indicates arbitrage potential, making STAP a reliable metric for arbitrage detection. Using a token graph comprising 11 tokens and 18 liquidity pools based on Uniswap V2 data, we observe a decline in DEX efficiency between June 21 and November 8, 2024. Simulations comparing two routing algorithms-Yu Zhang et al.’s line-graph-based method and the depth-first search (DFS) algorithm-show that employing more profitable routing improves DEX efficiency and trader returns over time. Moreover, while total value locked (TVL) remains stable with the line-graph method, it increases under the DFS algorithm, indicating greater aggregate benefits for liquidity providers. ...

A Line Graph-Based Framework for Identifying Optimal Routing Paths in Decentralized Exchanges ArXiv ID: 2504.15809 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Decentralized exchanges, such as those employing constant product market makers (CPMMs) like Uniswap V2, play a crucial role in the blockchain ecosystem by enabling peer-to-peer token swaps without intermediaries. Despite the increasing volume of transactions, there remains limited research on identifying optimal trading paths across multiple DEXs. This paper presents a novel line-graph-based algorithm (LG) designed to efficiently discover profitable trading routes within DEX environments. We benchmark LG against the widely adopted Depth-First Search (DFS) algorithm under a linear routing scenario, encompassing platforms such as Uniswap, SushiSwap, and PancakeSwap. Experimental results demonstrate that LG consistently identifies trading paths that are as profitable as, or more profitable than, those found by DFS, while incurring comparable gas costs. Evaluations on Uniswap V2 token graphs across two temporal snapshots further validate LG’s performance. Although LG exhibits exponential runtime growth with respect to graph size in empirical tests, it remains viable for practical, real-world use cases. Our findings underscore the potential of the LG algorithm for industrial adoption, offering tangible benefits to traders and market participants in the DeFi space. ...

QubitSwap: The Informational Edge in Decentralised Exchanges ArXiv ID: 2504.06281 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Decentralised exchanges (DEXs) have transformed trading by enabling trustless, permissionless transactions, yet they face significant challenges such as impermanent loss and slippage, which undermine profitability for liquidity providers and traders. In this paper, we introduce QubitSwap, an innovative DEX model designed to tackle these issues through a hybrid approach that integrates an external oracle price with internal pool dynamics. This is achieved via a parameter $z$, which governs the balance between these price sources, creating a flexible and adaptive pricing mechanism. Through rigorous mathematical analysis, we derive a novel reserve function and pricing model that substantially reduces impermanent loss and slippage compared to traditional DEX frameworks. Notably, our results show that as $z$ approaches 1, slippage approaches zero, enhancing trading stability. QubitSwap marks a novel approach in DEX design, delivering a more efficient and resilient platform. This work not only advances the theoretical foundations of decentralised finance but also provides actionable solutions for the broader DeFi ecosystem. ...

Better market Maker Algorithm to Save Impermanent Loss with High Liquidity Retention ArXiv ID: 2502.20001 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Decentralized exchanges (DEXs) face persistent challenges in liquidity retention and user engagement due to inefficiencies in conventional automated market maker (AMM) designs. This work proposes a dual-mechanism framework to address these limitations: a ``Better Market Maker (BMM)’’, which is a liquidity-optimized AMM based on a power-law invariant ($X^nY = K$, $n = 4$), and a dynamic rebate system (DRS) for redistributing transaction fees. The segment-specific BMM reduces impermanent loss by 36% compared to traditional constant-product ($XY = K$) models, while retaining 3.98x more liquidity during price volatility. The DRS allocates fees ($γV$, $γ\in {“0.003, 0.005, 0.01"}$) with a rebate ratio $ρ\in [“0.3, 0.4”]$ to incentivize trader participation and maintain continuous capital injection. Simulations under high-volatility conditions demonstrate impermanent loss reductions of 36.0% and 40% higher user engagement compared to static fee models. By segmenting markets into high-, mid-, and low-volatility regimes, the framework achieves liquidity depth comparable to centralized exchanges (CEXs) while maintaining decentralized governance and retaining value within the cryptocurrency ecosystem. ...

Approaching multifractal complexity in decentralized cryptocurrency trading ArXiv ID: 2411.05951 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Multifractality is a concept that helps compactly grasping the most essential features of the financial dynamics. In its fully developed form, this concept applies to essentially all mature financial markets and even to more liquid cryptocurrencies traded on the centralized exchanges. A new element that adds complexity to cryptocurrency markets is the possibility of decentralized trading. Based on the extracted tick-by-tick transaction data from the Universal Router contract of the Uniswap decentralized exchange, from June 6, 2023, to June 30, 2024, the present study using Multifractal Detrended Fluctuation Analysis (MFDFA) shows that even though liquidity on these new exchanges is still much lower compared to centralized exchanges convincing traces of multifractality are already emerging on this new trading as well. The resulting multifractal spectra are however strongly left-side asymmetric which indicates that this multifractality comes primarily from large fluctuations and small ones are more of the uncorrelated noise type. What is particularly interesting here is the fact that multifractality is more developed for time series representing transaction volumes than rates of return. On the level of these larger events a trace of multifractal cross-correlations between the two characteristics is also observed. ...

What Drives Liquidity on Decentralized Exchanges? Evidence from the Uniswap Protocol ArXiv ID: 2410.19107 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We study liquidity on decentralized exchanges (DEXs), identifying factors at the platform, blockchain, token pair, and liquidity pool levels with predictive power for market depth metrics. We introduce the v2 counterfactual spread metric, a novel criterion which assesses the degree of liquidity concentration in pools using the ``concentrated liquidity’’ mechanism, allowing us to decompose the effect of a factor on market depth into two channels: total value locked (TVL) and concentration. We further explore how external liquidity from competing DEXs and private inventory on DEX aggregators influence market depth. We find that (i) gas prices, returns, and a DEX’s share of trading volume affect liquidity through concentration, (ii) internalization of order flow by private market makers affects TVL but not the overall market depth, and (iii) volatility, fee revenue, and markout affect liquidity through both channels. ...

am-AMM: An Auction-Managed Automated Market Maker ArXiv ID: 2403.03367 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Automated market makers (AMMs) have emerged as the dominant market mechanism for trading on decentralized exchanges implemented on blockchains. This paper presents a single mechanism that targets two important unsolved problems for AMMs: reducing losses to informed orderflow, and maximizing revenue from uninformed orderflow. The auction-managed AMM'' works by running a censorship-resistant onchain auction for the right to temporarily act as pool manager’’ for a constant-product AMM. The pool manager sets the swap fee rate on the pool, and also receives the accrued fees from swaps. The pool manager can exclusively capture some arbitrage by trading against the pool in response to small price movements, and also can set swap fees incorporating price sensitivity of retail orderflow and adapting to changing market conditions, with the benefits from both ultimately accruing to liquidity providers. Liquidity providers can enter and exit the pool freely in response to changing rent, though they must pay a small fee on withdrawal. We prove that under certain assumptions, this AMM should have higher liquidity in equilibrium than any standard, fixed-fee AMM. ...

Don’t Let MEV Slip: The Costs of Swapping on the Uniswap Protocol ArXiv ID: 2309.13648 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We present the first in-depth empirical characterization of the costs of trading on a decentralized exchange (DEX). Using quoted prices from the Uniswap Labs interface for two pools – USDC-ETH (5bps) and PEPE-ETH (30bps) – we evaluate the efficiency of trading on DEXs. Our main tool is slippage – the difference between the realized execution price of a trade, and its quoted price – which we breakdown into its benign and adversarial components. We also present an alternative way to quantify and identify slippage due to adversarial reordering of transactions, which we call reordering slippage, that does not require quoted prices or mempool data to calculate. We find that the composition of transaction costs varies tremendously with the trade’s characteristics. Specifically, while for small swaps, gas costs dominate costs, for large swaps price-impact and slippage account for the majority of it. Moreover, when trading PEPE, a popular ‘memecoin’, the probability of adversarial slippage is about 80% higher than when trading a mature asset like USDC. Overall, our results provide preliminary evidence that DEXs offer a compelling trust-less alternative to centralized exchanges for trading digital assets. ...

UAMM: Price-oracle based Automated Market Maker ArXiv ID: 2308.06375 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Automated market makers (AMMs) are pricing mechanisms utilized by decentralized exchanges (DEX). Traditional AMM approaches are constrained by pricing solely based on their own liquidity pool, without consideration of external markets or risk management for liquidity providers. In this paper, we propose a new approach known as UBET AMM (UAMM), which calculates prices by considering external market prices and the impermanent loss of the liquidity pool. Despite relying on external market prices, our method maintains the desired properties of a constant product curve when computing slippages. The key element of UAMM is determining the appropriate slippage amount based on the desired target balance, which encourages the liquidity pool to minimize impermanent loss. We demonstrate that our approach eliminates arbitrage opportunities when external market prices are efficient. ...