Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs)

Price manipulation schemes of new crypto-tokens in decentralized exchanges ArXiv ID: 2502.10512 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Blockchain technology has revolutionized financial markets by enabling decentralized exchanges (DEXs) that operate without intermediaries. Uniswap V2, a leading DEX, facilitates the rapid creation and trading of new tokens, which offer high return potential but exposing investors to significant risks. In this work, we analyze the financial impact of newly created tokens, assessing their market dynamics, profitability and liquidity manipulations. Our findings reveal that a significant portion of market liquidity is trapped in honeypots, reducing market efficiency and misleading investors. Applying a simple buy-and-hold strategy, we are able to uncover some major risks associated with investing in newly created tokens, including the widespread presence of rug pulls and sandwich attacks. We extract the optimal sandwich amount, revealing that their proliferation in new tokens stems from higher profitability in low-liquidity pools. Furthermore, we analyze the fundamental differences between token price evolution in swap time and physical time. Using clustering techniques, we highlight these differences and identify typical patterns of honeypot and sellable tokens. Our study provides insights into the risks and financial dynamics of decentralized markets and their challenges for investors. ...

An Improved Algorithm to Identify More Arbitrage Opportunities on Decentralized Exchanges ArXiv ID: 2406.16573 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract In decentralized exchanges (DEXs), the arbitrage paths exist abundantly in the form of both arbitrage loops (e.g. the arbitrage path starts from token A and back to token A again in the end, A, B,…, A) and non-loops (e.g. the arbitrage path starts from token A and stops at a different token N, A, B,…, N). The Moore-Bellman-Ford algorithm, often coupled with the ``walk to the root" technique, is commonly employed for detecting arbitrage loops in the token graph of decentralized exchanges (DEXs) such as Uniswap. However, a limitation of this algorithm is its ability to recognize only a limited number of arbitrage loops in each run. Additionally, it cannot specify the starting token of the detected arbitrage loops, further constraining its effectiveness in certain scenarios. Another limitation of this algorithm is its incapacity to detect non-loop arbitrage paths between any specified pairs of tokens. In this paper, we develop a new method to solve these problems by combining the line graph and a modified Moore-Bellman-Ford algorithm (MMBF). This method can help to find more arbitrage loops by detecting at least one arbitrage loop starting from any specified tokens in the DEXs and can detect the non-loop arbitrage paths between any pair of tokens. Then, we applied our algorithm to Uniswap V2 and found more arbitrage loops and non-loops indeed compared with applying the Moore-Bellman-Ford (MBF) combined algorithm. The found arbitrage profit by our method in some arbitrage paths can be even as high as one million dollars, far larger than that found by the MBF combined algorithm. Finally, we statistically compare the distribution of arbitrage path lengths and the arbitrage profit detected by both our method and the MBF combined algorithm, and depict how potential arbitrage opportunities change with time by our method. ...

Profit Maximization In Arbitrage Loops ArXiv ID: 2406.16600 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Cyclic arbitrage chances exist abundantly among decentralized exchanges (DEXs), like Uniswap V2. For an arbitrage cycle (loop), researchers or practitioners usually choose a specific token, such as Ether as input, and optimize their input amount to get the net maximal amount of the specific token as arbitrage profit. By considering the tokens’ prices from CEXs in this paper, the new arbitrage profit, called monetized arbitrage profit, will be quantified as the product of the net number of a specific token we got from the arbitrage loop and its corresponding price in CEXs. Based on this concept, we put forward three different strategies to maximize the monetized arbitrage profit for each arbitrage loop. The first strategy is called the MaxPrice strategy. Under this strategy, arbitrageurs start arbitrage only from the token with the highest CEX price. The second strategy is called the MaxMax strategy. Under this strategy, we calculate the monetized arbitrage profit for each token as input in turn in the arbitrage loop. Then, we pick up the most maximal monetized arbitrage profit among them as the monetized arbitrage profit of the MaxMax strategy. The third one is called the Convex Optimization strategy. By mapping the MaxMax strategy to a convex optimization problem, we proved that the Convex Optimization strategy could get more profit in theory than the MaxMax strategy, which is proved again in a given example. We also proved that if no arbitrage profit exists according to the MaxMax strategy, then the Convex Optimization strategy can not detect any arbitrage profit, either. However, the empirical data analysis denotes that the profitability of the Convex Optimization strategy is almost equal to that of the MaxMax strategy, and the MaxPrice strategy is not reliable in getting the maximal monetized arbitrage profit compared to the MaxMax strategy. ...

Blockchain scaling and liquidity concentration on decentralized exchanges ArXiv ID: 2306.17742 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Liquidity providers (LPs) on decentralized exchanges (DEXs) can protect themselves from adverse selection risk by updating their positions more frequently. However, repositioning is costly, because LPs have to pay gas fees for each update. We analyze the causal relation between repositioning and liquidity concentration around the market price, using the entry of blockchain scaling solutions, Arbitrum and Polygon, as our instruments. Lower gas fees on scaling solutions allow LPs to update more frequently than on Ethereum. Our results demonstrate that higher repositioning intensity and precision lead to greater liquidity concentration, which benefits small trades by reducing their slippage. ...