Equities (Market Microstructure)

Liquidity Competition Between Brokers and an Informed Trader ArXiv ID: 2503.08287 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We study a multi-agent setting in which brokers transact with an informed trader. Through a sequential Stackelberg-type game, brokers manage trading costs and adverse selection with an informed trader. In particular, supplying liquidity to the informed traders allows the brokers to speculate based on the flow information. They simultaneously attempt to minimize inventory risk and trading costs with the lit market based on the informed order flow, also known as the internalization-externalization strategy. We solve in closed form for the trading strategy that the informed trader uses with each broker and propose a system of equations which classify the equilibrium strategies of the brokers. By solving these equations numerically we may study the resulting strategies in equilibrium. Finally, we formulate a competitive game between brokers in order to determine the liquidity prices subject to precommitment supplied to the informed trader and provide a numerical example in which the resulting equilibrium is not Pareto efficient. ...

Randomization in Optimal Execution Games ArXiv ID: 2503.08833 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We study optimal execution in markets with transient price impact in a competitive setting with $N$ traders. Motivated by prior negative results on the existence of pure Nash equilibria, we consider randomized strategies for the traders and whether allowing such strategies can restore the existence of equilibria. We show that given a randomized strategy, there is a non-randomized strategy with strictly lower expected execution cost, and moreover this de-randomization can be achieved by a simple averaging procedure. As a consequence, Nash equilibria cannot contain randomized strategies, and non-existence of pure equilibria implies non-existence of randomized equilibria. Separately, we also establish uniqueness of equilibria. Both results hold in a general transaction cost model given by a strictly positive definite impact decay kernel and a convex trading cost. ...

Unwinding Toxic Flow with Partial Information ArXiv ID: 2407.04510 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We consider a central trading desk which aggregates the inflow of clients’ orders with unobserved toxicity, i.e. persistent adverse directionality. The desk chooses either to internalise the inflow or externalise it to the market in a cost effective manner. In this model, externalising the order flow creates both price impact costs and an additional market feedback reaction for the inflow of trades. The desk’s objective is to maximise the daily trading P&L subject to end of the day inventory penalization. We formulate this setting as a partially observable stochastic control problem and solve it in two steps. First, we derive the filtered dynamics of the inventory and toxicity, projected to the observed filtration, which turns the stochastic control problem into a fully observed problem. Then we use a variational approach in order to derive the unique optimal trading strategy. We illustrate our results for various scenarios in which the desk is facing momentum and mean-reverting toxicity. Our implementation shows that the P&L performance gap between the partially observable problem and the full information case are of order $0.01%$ in all tested scenarios. ...

Macroscopic Market Making Games via Multidimensional Decoupling Field ArXiv ID: 2406.05662 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Building on the macroscopic market making framework as a control problem, this paper investigates its extension to stochastic games. In the context of price competition, each agent is benchmarked against the best quote offered by the others. We begin with the linear case. While constructing the solution directly, the \textit{“ordering property”} and the dimension reduction in the equilibrium are revealed. For the non-linear case, we extend the decoupling approach by introducing a multidimensional \textit{“characteristic equation”} to analyse the well-posedness of the forward-backward stochastic differential equations. Properties of the coefficients in this characteristic equation are derived using tools from non-smooth analysis. Several new well-posedness results are presented. ...

An Algebraic Framework for the Modeling of Limit Order Books ArXiv ID: 2406.04969 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Introducing an algebraic framework for modeling limit order books (LOBs) with tools from physics and stochastic processes, our proposed framework captures the creation and annihilation of orders, order matching, and the time evolution of the LOB state. It also enables compositional settings, accommodating the interaction of heterogeneous traders and different market structures. We employ Dirac notation and generalized generating functions to describe the state space and dynamics of LOBs. The utility of this framework is shown through simulations of simplified market scenarios, illustrating how variations in trader behavior impact key market observables such as spread, return volatility, and liquidity. The algebraic representation allows for exact simulations using the Gillespie algorithm, providing a robust tool for exploring the implications of market design and policy changes on LOB dynamics. Future research can expand this framework to incorporate more complex order types, adaptive event rates, and multi-asset trading environments, offering deeper insights into market microstructure and trader behavior and estimation of key drivers for market microstructure dynamics. ...