Governance

Vote Delegation in DeFi Governance ArXiv ID: 2503.11940 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We investigate the drivers of vote delegation in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), using the Uniswap governance DAO as a laboratory. We show that parties with fewer self-owned votes and those affiliated with the controlling venture capital firm, Andreesen Horowitz (a16z), receive more vote delegations. These patterns suggest that while the Uniswap ecosystem values decentralization, a16z may engage in window-dressing around it. Moreover, we find that an active and successful track record in submitting improvement proposals, especially in the final stage, leads to more vote delegations, indicating that delegation in DAOs is at least partly reputation- or merit-based. Combined, our findings provide new insights into how governance and decentralization operate in DeFi. ...

The Roberts Court’s Assault on Democracy ArXiv ID: ssrn-3540318 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract This article argues that economic and political developments in the last fifty years have in many respects undermined America’s democratic institutions and that Keywords: Political Risk, Institutional Economics, Macroeconomics, Economic Policy, Governance, Macro Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 0.0/10 Empirical Rigor: 0.0/10 Quadrant: Philosophers Why: The paper is a legal and political commentary on the Roberts Court’s impact on democracy, with no mathematical or empirical analysis of financial markets. flowchart TD A["Research Question<br>How has the Roberts Court<br>impacted American Democracy?"] --> B["Methodology: Case Law &<br>Historical Institutional Analysis"] B --> C["Inputs: Decisions,<br>Campaign Finance Data,<br>Political Polarization Metrics"] C --> D["Computational Process<br>Cost-Benefit &<br>Institutional Risk Analysis"] D --> E["Key Findings<br>Erosion of voting rights,<br>wealth-influenced policy,<br>gridlock in governance"]