false

Trading on Terror?

Trading on Terror? ArXiv ID: ssrn-4652027 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Recent scholarship shows that informed traders increasingly disguise trades in economically linked securities such as exchange-traded funds (ETFs). Linking that Keywords: Informed Trading, Market Microstructure, ETFs, Information Asymmetry, Arbitrage, Equities Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 1.5/10 Empirical Rigor: 8.0/10 Quadrant: Street Traders Why: The paper relies on statistical event studies and rank-order analysis rather than advanced mathematical modeling, placing it at the lower end of math complexity; however, it employs high-quality financial data (FINRA, TASE, SEC) and robust empirical methods (placebo tests, counterfactuals, statistical significance thresholds) to analyze real-world trading patterns, warranting high empirical rigor. flowchart TD A["Research Goal: How do informed traders disguise<br>trading in securities linked to terror events?"] --> B["Method: Event Study &<br>Multi-Asset Analysis"] B --> C["Data: Global Terror Events &<br>Equity/ETF Transaction Data"] C --> D["Process: Identify Abnormal Trading<br>in Linked Securities vs. Equities"] D --> E["Analysis: Cross-Sectional Regressions<br>controlling for Arbitrage Constraints"] E --> F["Finding: Increased informed trading<br>in linked ETFs during terror events"] F --> G["Outcome: Displacement of<br>information asymmetry via market linking"]

January 25, 2026 · 1 min · Research Team

Identification of phase correlations in Financial Stock Market Turbulence

Identification of phase correlations in Financial Stock Market Turbulence ArXiv ID: 2508.20105 “View on arXiv” Authors: Kiran Sharma, Abhijit Dutta, Rupak Mukherjee Abstract The basis of arbitrage methods depends on the circulation of information within the framework of the financial market. Following the work of Modigliani and Miller, it has become a vital part of discussions related to the study of financial networks and predictions. The emergence of the efficient market hypothesis by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll in the early 1970s opened up the door for discussion of information affecting the price in the market and thereby creating asymmetries and price distortion. Whenever the micro and macroeconomic factors change, there is a high probability of information asymmetry in the market, and this asymmetry of information creates turbulence in the market. The analysis and interpretation of turbulence caused by the differences in information is crucial in understanding the nature of the stock market using price patterns and fluctuations. Even so, the traditional approaches are not capable of analyzing the cyclical price fluctuations outside the realm of wave structures of securities prices, and a proper and effective technique to assess the nature of the Financial market. Consequently, the analysis of the price fluctuations by applying the theories and computational techniques of mathematical physics ensures that such cycles are disintegrated, and the outcome of decomposed cycles is elucidated to understand the impression of the information on the genesis and discovery of price and to assess the nature of stock market turbulence. In this regard, the paper will provide a framework of Spectrum analysis that decomposes the pricing patterns and is capable of determining the pricing behavior, eventually assisting in examining the nature of turbulence in the National Stock Exchange of India. ...

August 12, 2025 · 3 min · Research Team

Information Leakages in the Green Bond Market

Information Leakages in the Green Bond Market ArXiv ID: 2504.03311 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Public announcement dates are used in the green bond literature to measure equity market reactions to upcoming green bond issues. We find a sizeable number of green bond announcements were pre-dated by anonymous information leakages on the Bloomberg Terminal. From a candidate set of 2,036 ‘Bloomberg News’ and ‘Bloomberg First Word’ headlines gathered between 2016 and 2022, we identify 259 instances of green bond-related information being released before being publicly announced by the issuing firm. These pre-announcement leaks significantly alter the equity trading dynamics of the issuing firms over intraday and daily event windows. Significant negative abnormal returns and increased trading volumes are observed following news leaks about upcoming green bond issues. These negative investor reactions are concentrated amongst financial firms, and leaks that arrive pre-market or early in market trading. We find equity price movements following news leaks can be explained to a greater degree than following public announcements. Sectoral differences are also observed in the key drivers behind investor reactions to green bond leaks by non-financials (Tobin’s Q and free cash flow) and financials (ROA). Our results suggest that information leakages have a strong impact on market behaviour, and should be accounted for in green bond literature. Our findings also have broader ramifications for financial literature going forward. Privileged access to financially material information, courtesy of the ubiquitous use of Bloomberg Terminals by professional investors, highlights the need for event studies to consider wider sets of communication channels to confirm the date at which information first becomes available. ...

April 4, 2025 · 2 min · Research Team

Strategic Learning and Trading in Broker-Mediated Markets

Strategic Learning and Trading in Broker-Mediated Markets ArXiv ID: 2412.20847 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We study strategic interactions in a broker-mediated market. A broker provides liquidity to an informed trader and to noise traders while managing inventory in the lit market. The broker and the informed trader maximise their trading performance while filtering each other’s private information; the trader estimates the broker’s trading activity in the lit market while the broker estimates the informed trader’s private signal. Brokers hold a strategic advantage over traders who rely solely on prices to filter information. We find that information leakage in the client’s trading flow yields an economic value to the broker that is comparable to transaction costs; she speculates profitably and mitigates risk effectively, which, in turn, adversely impacts the informed trader’s performance. In contrast, low signal-to-noise sources, such as prices, result in the broker’s trading performance being indistinguishable from that of a naive strategy that internalises noise flow, externalises informed flow, and offloads inventory at a constant rate. ...

December 30, 2024 · 2 min · Research Team

Stablecoin Runs and Disclosure Policy in the Presence of Large Sales

Stablecoin Runs and Disclosure Policy in the Presence of Large Sales ArXiv ID: 2408.07227 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Stablecoins have historically depegged due from par to large sales, possibly of speculative nature, or poor reserve asset quality. Using a global game which addresses both concerns, we show that the selling pressure on stablecoin holders increases in the presence of a large sale. While precise public knowledge reduces (increases) the probability of a run when fundamentals are strong (weak), interestingly, more precise private signals increase (reduce) the probability of a run when fundamentals are strong (weak), potentially explaining the stability of opaque stablecoins. The total run probability can be decomposed into components representing risks from large sales and poor collateral. By analyzing how these risk components vary with respect to information uncertainty and fundamentals, we can split the fundamental space into regions based on the type of risk a stablecoin issuer is more prone to. We suggest testable implications and connect our model’s implications to real-world applications, including depegging events and the no-questions-asked property of money. ...

July 23, 2024 · 2 min · Research Team

Strategic Informed Trading and the Value of Private Information

Strategic Informed Trading and the Value of Private Information ArXiv ID: 2404.08757 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We consider a market of risky financial assets whose participants are an informed trader, a representative uninformed trader, and noisy liquidity providers. We prove the existence of a market-clearing equilibrium when the insider internalizes her power to impact prices, but the uninformed trader takes prices as given. Compared to the associated competitive economy, in equilibrium the insider strategically reveals a noisier signal, and prices are less reactive to publicly available information. Additionally, and in direct contrast to the related literature, in equilibrium the insider’s indirect utility monotonically increases in the signal precision. Therefore, the insider is motivated not only to obtain, but also to refine, her signal. Lastly, we show that compared to the competitive economy, the insider’s internalization of price impact is utility improving for the uninformed trader, but somewhat surprisingly may be utility decreasing for the insider herself. This utility reduction occurs provided the insider is sufficiently risk averse compared to the uninformed trader, and provided the signal is of sufficiently low quality. ...

April 12, 2024 · 2 min · Research Team

Trading Large Orders in the Presence of Multiple High-Frequency Anticipatory Traders

Trading Large Orders in the Presence of Multiple High-Frequency Anticipatory Traders ArXiv ID: 2403.08202 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We investigate a market with a normal-speed informed trader (IT) who may employ mixed strategy and multiple anticipatory high-frequency traders (HFTs) who are under different inventory pressures, in a three-period Kyle’s model. The pure- and mixed-strategy equilibria are considered and the results provide recommendations for IT’s randomization strategy with different numbers of HFTs. Some surprising results about investors’ profits arise: the improvement of anticipatory traders’ speed or a more precise prediction may harm themselves but help IT. ...

March 13, 2024 · 2 min · Research Team

Is Kyle's equilibrium model stable?

Is Kyle’s equilibrium model stable? ArXiv ID: 2307.09392 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract In the dynamic discrete-time trading setting of Kyle (1985), we prove that Kyle’s equilibrium model is stable when there are one or two trading times. For three or more trading times, we prove that Kyle’s equilibrium is not stable. These theoretical results are proven to hold irrespectively of all Kyle’s input parameters. Keywords: Kyle’s model, market microstructure, equilibrium stability, dynamic trading, information asymmetry, Equities (Microstructure) ...

July 18, 2023 · 1 min · Research Team

All that Glitters: The Effect of Attention and News on the Buying Behavior of Individual and Institutional Investors

All that Glitters: The Effect of Attention and News on the Buying Behavior of Individual and Institutional Investors ArXiv ID: ssrn-1151595 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We test and confirm the hypothesis that individual investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks, e.g., stocks in the news, stocks experiencing high abn Keywords: Investor attention, Behavioral finance, Market microstructure, Trading behavior, Information asymmetry, Equities Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 2.5/10 Empirical Rigor: 8.0/10 Quadrant: Street Traders Why: The paper focuses on empirical testing of a behavioral hypothesis using event studies and regressions on large-scale trading datasets, requiring significant data processing and backtesting but relying on relatively straightforward statistical models. flowchart TD A["Research Goal<br/>Test if individual investors<br/>are net buyers of<br/>attention-grabbing stocks"] --> B["Methodology<br/>Event Study & Regression Analysis"] B --> C["Data Inputs<br/>Daily Trades (TAQ) &<br/>News Data (Reuters)"] C --> D["Computation<br/>Calculate Abnormal Attention<br/>(News/High Volume)<br/>and Net Buying Imbalance"] D --> E{"Key Findings"} E --> F["Individuals: Net Buyers<br/>of high-attention stocks"] E --> G["Institutions: Net Sellers<br/>or no consistent effect"] E --> H["Outcome: Attention-driven<br/>demand creates temporary<br/>price pressure"]

June 26, 2008 · 1 min · Research Team

Discretionary Disclosure Strategies in Corporate Narratives: Incremental Information or Impression Management?

Discretionary Disclosure Strategies in Corporate Narratives: Incremental Information or Impression Management? ArXiv ID: ssrn-1089447 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Prior research assumes that discretionary disclosures either (a) contribute to useful decision making by overcoming information asymmetries between managers and Keywords: Information Asymmetry, Voluntary Disclosure, Market Microstructure, Signaling Theory, Corporate Governance, Equity Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 2.0/10 Empirical Rigor: 3.0/10 Quadrant: Philosophers Why: The paper is a literature review synthesizing prior accounting research, focusing on taxonomies and theoretical frameworks (low math complexity) without original data analysis, backtests, or implementation details (low empirical rigor). flowchart TD A["Research Goal: Do discretionary disclosures inform investors or manage impressions?"] --> B["Method: Content analysis of corporate narratives<br/>Quantifies information vs. sentiment scores"] B --> C["Data: 10-K filings / MD&A sections<br/>Market data for price impact"] C --> D["Computational Process: Textual analysis &<br/>Regression of scores on market microstructure metrics"] D --> E{"Outcomes"} E --> F["Information Effect: Reduced information asymmetry<br/>correlates with information scores"] E --> G["Impression Management Effect: Low-content, high-sentiment<br/>disclosures show limited price impact"]

February 5, 2008 · 1 min · Research Team