Interbank Networks

A data-driven econo-financial stress-testing framework to estimate the effect of supply chain networks on financial systemic risk ArXiv ID: 2502.17044 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Supply chain disruptions constitute an often underestimated risk for financial stability. As in financial networks, systemic risks in production networks arises when the local failure of one firm impacts the production of others and might trigger cascading disruptions that affect significant parts of the economy. Here, we study how systemic risk in production networks translates into financial systemic risk through a mechanism where supply chain contagion leads to correlated bank-firm loan defaults. We propose a financial stress-testing framework for micro- and macro-prudential applications that features a national firm level supply chain network in combination with interbank network layers. The model is calibrated by using a unique data set including about 1 million firm-level supply links, practically all bank-firm loans, and all interbank loans in a small European economy. As a showcase we implement a real COVID-19 shock scenario on the firm level. This model allows us to study how the disruption dynamics in the real economy can lead to interbank solvency contagion dynamics. We estimate to what extent this amplifies financial systemic risk. We discuss the relative importance of these contagion channels and find an increase of interbank contagion by 70% when production network contagion is present. We then examine the financial systemic risk firms bring to banks and find an increase of up to 28% in the presence of the interbank contagion channel. This framework is the first financial systemic risk model to take agent-level dynamics of the production network and shocks of the real economy into account which opens a path for directly, and event-driven understanding of the dynamical interaction between the real economy and financial systems. ...

Reciprocity in Interbank Markets ArXiv ID: 2412.10329 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Weighted reciprocity between two agents can be defined as the minimum of sending and receiving value in their bilateral relationship. In financial networks, such reciprocity characterizes the importance of individual banks as both liquidity absorber and provider, a feature typically attributed to large, intermediating dealer banks. In this paper we develop an exponential random graph model that can account for reciprocal links of each node simultaneously on the topological as well as on the weighted level. We provide an exact expression for the normalizing constant and thus a closed-form solution for the graph probability distribution. Applying this statistical null model to Italian interbank data, we find that before the great financial crisis (i) banks displayed significantly more weighted reciprocity compared to what the lower-order network features (size and volume distributions) would predict (ii) with a disappearance of this deviation once the early periods of the crisis set in, (iii) a trend which can be attributed in particular to smaller banks (dis)engaging in bilateral high-value trading relationships. Moreover, we show that neglecting reciprocal links and weights can lead to spurious findings of triadic relationships. As the hierarchical structure in the network is found to be compatible with its transitive but not with its intransitive triadic sub-graphs, the interbank market seems to be well-characterized by a hierarchical core-periphery structure enhanced by non-hierarchical reciprocal trading relationships. ...

Critical density for network reconstruction ArXiv ID: 2305.17285 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract The structure of many financial networks is protected by privacy and has to be inferred from aggregate observables. Here we consider one of the most successful network reconstruction methods, producing random graphs with desired link density and where the observed constraints (related to the market size of each node) are replicated as averages over the graph ensemble, but not in individual realizations. We show that there is a minimum critical link density below which the method exhibits an `unreconstructability’ phase where at least one of the constraints, while still reproduced on average, is far from its expected value in typical individual realizations. We establish the scaling of the critical density for various theoretical and empirical distributions of interbank assets and liabilities, showing that the threshold differs from the critical densities for the onset of the giant component and of the unique component in the graph. We also find that, while dense networks are always reconstructable, sparse networks are unreconstructable if their structure is homogeneous, while they can display a crossover to reconstructability if they have an appropriate core-periphery or heterogeneous structure. Since the reconstructability of interbank networks is related to market clearing, our results suggest that central bank interventions aimed at lowering the density of links should take network structure into account to avoid unintentional liquidity crises where the supply and demand of all financial institutions cannot be matched simultaneously. ...