Liquidity Providers (LPs)

Equilibrium Reward for Liquidity Providers in Automated Market Makers ArXiv ID: 2503.22502 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We find the equilibrium contract that an automated market maker (AMM) offers to their strategic liquidity providers (LPs) in order to maximize the order flow that gets processed by the venue. Our model is formulated as a leader-follower stochastic game, where the venue is the leader and a representative LP is the follower. We derive approximate closed-form equilibrium solutions to the stochastic game and analyze the reward structure. Our findings suggest that under the equilibrium contract, LPs have incentives to add liquidity to the pool only when higher liquidity on average attracts more noise trading. The equilibrium contract depends on the external price, the pool reference price, and the pool reserves. Our framework offers insights into AMM design for maximizing order flow while ensuring LP profitability. ...

Blockchain scaling and liquidity concentration on decentralized exchanges ArXiv ID: 2306.17742 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Liquidity providers (LPs) on decentralized exchanges (DEXs) can protect themselves from adverse selection risk by updating their positions more frequently. However, repositioning is costly, because LPs have to pay gas fees for each update. We analyze the causal relation between repositioning and liquidity concentration around the market price, using the entry of blockchain scaling solutions, Arbitrum and Polygon, as our instruments. Lower gas fees on scaling solutions allow LPs to update more frequently than on Ethereum. Our results demonstrate that higher repositioning intensity and precision lead to greater liquidity concentration, which benefits small trades by reducing their slippage. ...

FLAIR: A Metric for Liquidity Provider Competitiveness in Automated Market Makers ArXiv ID: 2306.09421 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract This paper aims to enhance the understanding of liquidity provider (LP) returns in automated market makers (AMMs). LPs face market risk as well as adverse selection due to risky asset holdings in the pool that they provide liquidity to and the informational asymmetry between informed traders (arbitrageurs) and AMMs. Loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR) quantifies the adverse selection cost (Milionis et al., 2022a), and is a popular metric to evaluate the flow toxicity to an AMM. However, individual LP returns are critically affected by another factor orthogonal to the above: the competitiveness among LPs. This work introduces a novel metric for LP competitiveness, called FLAIR (short for fee liquidity-adjusted instantaneous returns), that aims to supplement LVR in assessments of LP performance to capture the dynamic behavior of LPs in a pool. Our metric reflects the characteristics of fee return-on-capital, and differentiates active liquidity provisioning strategies in AMMs. To illustrate how both flow toxicity, accounting for the sophistication of the counterparty of LPs, as well as LP competitiveness, accounting for the sophistication of the competition among LPs, affect individual LP returns, we propose a quadrant interpretation where all of these characteristics may be readily visualized. We examine LP competitiveness in an ex-post fashion, and show example cases in all of which our metric confirms the expected nuances and intuition of competitiveness among LPs. FLAIR has particular merit in empirical analyses, and is able to better inform practical assessments of AMM pools. ...