Liquidity Risk

Agent-based Liquidity Risk Modelling for Financial Markets ArXiv ID: 2505.15296 “View on arXiv” Authors: Perukrishnen Vytelingum, Rory Baggott, Namid Stillman, Jianfei Zhang, Dingqiu Zhu, Tao Chen, Justin Lyon Abstract In this paper, we describe a novel agent-based approach for modelling the transaction cost of buying or selling an asset in financial markets, e.g., to liquidate a large position as a result of a margin call to meet financial obligations. The simple act of buying or selling in the market causes a price impact and there is a cost described as liquidity risk. For example, when selling a large order, there is market slippage – each successive trade will execute at the same or worse price. When the market adjusts to the new information revealed by the execution of such a large order, we observe in the data a permanent price impact that can be attributed to the change in the fundamental value as market participants reassess the value of the asset. In our ABM model, we introduce a novel mechanism where traders assume orderflow is informed and each trade reveals some information about the value of the asset, and traders update their belief of the fundamental value for every trade. The result is emergent, realistic price impact without oversimplifying the problem as most stylised models do, but within a realistic framework that models the exchange with its protocols, its limit orderbook and its auction mechanism and that can calculate the transaction cost of any execution strategy without limitation. Our stochastic ABM model calculates the costs and uncertainties of buying and selling in a market by running Monte-Carlo simulations, for a better understanding of liquidity risk and can be used to optimise for optimal execution under liquidity risk. We demonstrate its practical application in the real world by calculating the liquidity risk for the Hang-Seng Futures Index. ...

Bitcoin ETF: Opportunities and risk ArXiv ID: 2409.00270 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract The year 2024 witnessed a major development in the cryptocurrency industry with the long-awaited approval of spot Bitcoin exchange-traded funds (ETFs). This innovation provides investors with a new, regulated path to gain exposure to Bitcoin through a familiar investment vehicle (Kumar et al., 2024). However, unlike traditional ETFs that directly hold underlying assets, Bitcoin ETFs rely on a creation and redemption process managed by authorized participants (APs). This unique structure introduces distinct characteristics in terms of premium/discount behavior compared to traditional ETFs. This paper investigates the premium and discount patterns observed in Bitcoin ETFs during first four-month period (January 11th, 2024, to May 17th, 2024). Our analysis reveals that these patterns differ significantly from those observed in traditional index ETFs, potentially exposing investors to additional risk factors. By identifying and analyzing these risk factors associated with Bitcoin ETF premiums/discounts, this paper aims to achieve two key objectives: Enhance market understanding: Equip and market and investors with a deeper comprehension of the unique liquidity risks inherent in Bitcoin ETFs. Provide a clearer risk management frameworks: Offer a clearer perspective on the risk-return profile of digital asset ETFs, specifically focusing on Bitcoin ETFs. Through a thorough analysis of premium/discount behavior and the underlying factors contributing to it, this paper strives to contribute valuable insights for investors navigating the evolving landscape of digital asset investments ...

Stablecoin Runs and Disclosure Policy in the Presence of Large Sales ArXiv ID: 2408.07227 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Stablecoins have historically depegged due from par to large sales, possibly of speculative nature, or poor reserve asset quality. Using a global game which addresses both concerns, we show that the selling pressure on stablecoin holders increases in the presence of a large sale. While precise public knowledge reduces (increases) the probability of a run when fundamentals are strong (weak), interestingly, more precise private signals increase (reduce) the probability of a run when fundamentals are strong (weak), potentially explaining the stability of opaque stablecoins. The total run probability can be decomposed into components representing risks from large sales and poor collateral. By analyzing how these risk components vary with respect to information uncertainty and fundamentals, we can split the fundamental space into regions based on the type of risk a stablecoin issuer is more prone to. We suggest testable implications and connect our model’s implications to real-world applications, including depegging events and the no-questions-asked property of money. ...

Beyond the Bid-Ask: Strategic Insights into Spread Prediction and the Global Mid-Price Phenomenon ArXiv ID: 2404.11722 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract This research extends the conventional concepts of the bid–ask spread (BAS) and mid-price to include the total market order book bid–ask spread (TMOBBAS) and the global mid-price (GMP). Using high-frequency trading data, we investigate these new constructs, finding that they have heavy tails and significant deviations from normality in the distributions of their log returns, which are confirmed by three different methods. We shift from a static to a dynamic analysis, employing the ARMA(1,1)-GARCH(1,1) model to capture the temporal dependencies in the return time-series, with the normal inverse Gaussian distribution used to capture the heavy tails of the returns. We apply an option pricing model to address the risks associated with the low liquidity indicated by the TMOBBAS and GMP. Additionally, we employ the Rachev ratio to evaluate the risk–return performance at various depths of the limit order book and examine tail risk interdependencies across spread levels. This study provides insights into the dynamics of financial markets, offering tools for trading strategies and systemic risk management. ...