Loss-Versus-Rebalancing (LVR)

Modeling Loss-Versus-Rebalancing in Automated Market Makers via Continuous-Installment Options ArXiv ID: 2508.02971 “View on arXiv” Authors: Srisht Fateh Singh, Reina Ke Xin Li, Samuel Gaskin, Yuntao Wu, Jeffrey Klinck, Panagiotis Michalopoulos, Zissis Poulos, Andreas Veneris Abstract This paper mathematically models a constant-function automated market maker (CFAMM) position as a portfolio of exotic options, known as perpetual American continuous-installment (CI) options. This model replicates an AMM position’s delta at each point in time over an infinite time horizon, thus taking into account the perpetual nature and optionality to withdraw of liquidity provision. This framework yields two key theoretical results: (a) It proves that the AMM’s adverse-selection cost, loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR), is analytically identical to the continuous funding fees (the time value decay or theta) earned by the at-the-money CI option embedded in the replicating portfolio. (b) A special case of this model derives an AMM liquidity position’s delta profile and boundaries that suffer approximately constant LVR, up to a bounded residual error, over an arbitrarily long forward window. Finally, the paper describes how the constant volatility parameter required by the perpetual option can be calibrated from the term structure of implied volatilities and estimates the errors for both implied volatility calibration and LVR residual error. Thus, this work provides a practical framework enabling liquidity providers to choose an AMM liquidity profile and price boundaries for an arbitrarily long, forward-looking time window where they can expect an approximately constant, price-independent LVR. The results establish a rigorous option-theoretic interpretation of AMMs and their LVR, and provide actionable guidance for liquidity providers in estimating future adverse-selection costs and optimizing position parameters. ...

Loss-Versus-Rebalancing under Deterministic and Generalized block-times ArXiv ID: 2505.05113 “View on arXiv” Authors: Alex Nezlobin, Martin Tassy Abstract Although modern blockchains almost universally produce blocks at fixed intervals, existing models still lack an analytical formula for the loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR) incurred by Automated Market Makers (AMMs) liquidity providers in this setting. Leveraging tools from random walk theory, we derive the following closed-form approximation for the per block per unit of liquidity expected LVR under constant block time: [" \overline{"\mathrm{ARB"}}= \frac{",σ_b^{2"}} {",2+\sqrt{2π"},γ/(|ζ(1/2)|,σ_b),}+O!\bigl(e^{"-\mathrm{const"}\tfracγ{“σ_b”}}\bigr);\approx; \frac{“σ_b^{2”}}{",2 + 1.7164,γ/σ_b"}, "] where $σ_b$ is the intra-block asset volatility, $γ$ the AMM spread and $ζ$ the Riemann Zeta function. Our large Monte Carlo simulations show that this formula is in fact quasi-exact across practical parameter ranges. Extending our analysis to arbitrary block-time distributions as well, we demonstrate both that–under every admissible inter-block law–the probability that a block carries an arbitrage trade converges to a universal limit, and that only constant block spacing attains the asymptotically minimal LVR. This shows that constant block intervals provide the best possible protection against arbitrage for liquidity providers. ...

Rebalancing-versus-Rebalancing: Improving the fidelity of Loss-versus-Rebalancing ArXiv ID: 2410.23404 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Automated Market Makers (AMMs) hold assets and are constantly being rebalanced by external arbitrageurs to match external market prices. Loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR) is a pivotal metric for measuring how an AMM pool performs for its liquidity providers (LPs) relative to an idealised benchmark where rebalancing is done not via the action of arbitrageurs but instead by trading with a perfect centralised exchange with no fees, spread or slippage. This renders it an imperfect tool for judging rebalancing efficiency between execution platforms. We introduce Rebalancing-versus-rebalancing (RVR), a higher-fidelity model that better captures the frictions present in centralised rebalancing. We perform a battery of experiments comparing managing a portfolio on AMMs vs this new and more realistic centralised exchange benchmark-RVR. We are also particularly interested in dynamic AMMs that run strategies beyond fixed weight allocations-Temporal Function Market Makers. This is particularly important for asset managers evaluating execution management systems. In this paper we simulate more than 1000 different strategies settings as well as testing hundreds of different variations in centralised exchange (CEX) fees, AMM fees & gas costs. We find that, under this modeling approach, AMM pools (even with no retail/noise traders) often offer superior execution and rebalancing efficiency compared to centralised rebalancing, for all but the lowest CEX fee levels. We also take a simple approach to model noise traders & find that even a small amount of noise volume increases modeled AMM performance such that CEX rebalancing finds it hard to compete. This indicates that decentralised AMM-based asset management can offer superior performance and execution management for asset managers looking to rebalance portfolios, offering an alternative use case for dynamic AMMs beyond core liquidity providing. ...

FLAIR: A Metric for Liquidity Provider Competitiveness in Automated Market Makers ArXiv ID: 2306.09421 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract This paper aims to enhance the understanding of liquidity provider (LP) returns in automated market makers (AMMs). LPs face market risk as well as adverse selection due to risky asset holdings in the pool that they provide liquidity to and the informational asymmetry between informed traders (arbitrageurs) and AMMs. Loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR) quantifies the adverse selection cost (Milionis et al., 2022a), and is a popular metric to evaluate the flow toxicity to an AMM. However, individual LP returns are critically affected by another factor orthogonal to the above: the competitiveness among LPs. This work introduces a novel metric for LP competitiveness, called FLAIR (short for fee liquidity-adjusted instantaneous returns), that aims to supplement LVR in assessments of LP performance to capture the dynamic behavior of LPs in a pool. Our metric reflects the characteristics of fee return-on-capital, and differentiates active liquidity provisioning strategies in AMMs. To illustrate how both flow toxicity, accounting for the sophistication of the counterparty of LPs, as well as LP competitiveness, accounting for the sophistication of the competition among LPs, affect individual LP returns, we propose a quadrant interpretation where all of these characteristics may be readily visualized. We examine LP competitiveness in an ex-post fashion, and show example cases in all of which our metric confirms the expected nuances and intuition of competitiveness among LPs. FLAIR has particular merit in empirical analyses, and is able to better inform practical assessments of AMM pools. ...