Market Makers

Can Large Language Models Trade? Testing Financial Theories with LLM Agents in Market Simulations ArXiv ID: 2504.10789 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract This paper presents a realistic simulated stock market where large language models (LLMs) act as heterogeneous competing trading agents. The open-source framework incorporates a persistent order book with market and limit orders, partial fills, dividends, and equilibrium clearing alongside agents with varied strategies, information sets, and endowments. Agents submit standardized decisions using structured outputs and function calls while expressing their reasoning in natural language. Three findings emerge: First, LLMs demonstrate consistent strategy adherence and can function as value investors, momentum traders, or market makers per their instructions. Second, market dynamics exhibit features of real financial markets, including price discovery, bubbles, underreaction, and strategic liquidity provision. Third, the framework enables analysis of LLMs’ responses to varying market conditions, similar to partial dependence plots in machine-learning interpretability. The framework allows simulating financial theories without closed-form solutions, creating experimental designs that would be costly with human participants, and establishing how prompts can generate correlated behaviors affecting market stability. ...

Non cooperative Liquidity Games and their application to bond market trading ArXiv ID: 2405.02865 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We present a new type of game, the Liquidity Game. We draw inspiration from the UK government bond market and apply game theoretic approaches to its analysis. In Liquidity Games, market participants (agents) use non-cooperative games where the players’ utility is directly defined by the liquidity of the game itself, offering a paradigm shift in our understanding of market dynamics. Each player’s utility is intricately linked to the liquidity generated within the game, making the utility endogenous and dynamic. Players are not just passive recipients of utility based on external factors but active participants whose strategies and actions collectively shape and are shaped by the liquidity of the market. This reflexivity introduces a level of complexity and realism previously unattainable in conventional models. We apply Liquidity Game theoretic approaches to a simple UK bond market interaction and present results for market design and strategic behavior of participants. We tackle one of the largest issues within this mechanism, namely what strategy should market makers utilize when uncertain about the type of market maker they are interacting with, and what structure might regulators wish to see. ...