Obizhaeva–Wang Model

High-Frequency Analysis of a Trading Game with Transient Price Impact ArXiv ID: 2512.11765 “View on arXiv” Authors: Marcel Nutz, Alessandro Prosperi Abstract We study the high-frequency limit of an $n$-trader optimal execution game in discrete time. Traders face transient price impact of Obizhaeva–Wang type in addition to quadratic instantaneous trading costs $θ(ΔX_t)^2$ on each transaction $ΔX_t$. There is a unique Nash equilibrium in which traders choose liquidation strategies minimizing expected execution costs. In the high-frequency limit where the grid of trading dates converges to the continuous interval $[“0,T”]$, the discrete equilibrium inventories converge at rate $1/N$ to the continuous-time equilibrium of an Obizhaeva–Wang model with additional quadratic costs $\vartheta_0(ΔX_0)^2$ and $\vartheta_T(ΔX_T)^2$ on initial and terminal block trades, where $\vartheta_0=(n-1)/2$ and $\vartheta_T=1/2$. The latter model was introduced by Campbell and Nutz as the limit of continuous-time equilibria with vanishing instantaneous costs. Our results extend and refine previous results of Schied, Strehle, and Zhang for the particular case $n=2$ where $\vartheta_0=\vartheta_T=1/2$. In particular, we show how the coefficients $\vartheta_0=(n-1)/2$ and $\vartheta_T=1/2$ arise endogenously in the high-frequency limit: the initial and terminal block costs of the continuous-time model are identified as the limits of the cumulative discrete instantaneous costs incurred over small neighborhoods of $0$ and $T$, respectively, and these limits are independent of $θ>0$. By contrast, when $θ=0$ the discrete-time equilibrium strategies and costs exhibit persistent oscillations and admit no high-frequency limit, mirroring the non-existence of continuous-time equilibria without boundary block costs. Our results show that two different types of trading frictions – a fine time discretization and small instantaneous costs in continuous time – have similar regularizing effects and select a canonical model in the limit. ...

Optimal Execution among $N$ Traders with Transient Price Impact ArXiv ID: 2501.09638 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We study $N$-player optimal execution games in an Obizhaeva–Wang model of transient price impact. When the game is regularized by an instantaneous cost on the trading rate, a unique equilibrium exists and we derive its closed form. Whereas without regularization, there is no equilibrium. We prove that existence is restored if (and only if) a very particular, time-dependent cost on block trades is added to the model. In that case, the equilibrium is particularly tractable. We show that this equilibrium is the limit of the regularized equilibria as the instantaneous cost parameter $\varepsilon$ tends to zero. Moreover, we explain the seemingly ad-hoc block cost as the limit of the equilibrium instantaneous costs. Notably, in contrast to the single-player problem, the optimal instantaneous costs do not vanish in the limit $\varepsilon\to0$. We use this tractable equilibrium to study the cost of liquidating in the presence of predators and the cost of anarchy. Our results also give a new interpretation to the erratic behaviors previously observed in discrete-time trading games with transient price impact. ...