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Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms' Market Values? Evidence from Korea

Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms’ Market Values? Evidence from Korea ArXiv ID: ssrn-311275 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We report strong OLS and instrumental variable evidence that an overall corporate governance index is an important and likely causal factor in explaining Keywords: corporate governance, OLS regression, instrumental variables, firm value, ownership structure, Equities (Corporate Governance) Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 2.0/10 Empirical Rigor: 7.0/10 Quadrant: Street Traders Why: The paper primarily uses OLS and instrumental variable (IV) regression methods without advanced mathematical derivations, placing math complexity at a low level. However, it demonstrates high empirical rigor with a clear backtest-ready design, including a proprietary index (KCGI), instrumental variables based on Korean legal rules, and sensitivity checks on market value metrics. flowchart TD A["Research Question: Does Corporate Governance<br>predict Korean firms' market value?"] A --> B["Data & Inputs<br>Firm-level governance & value data from Korea"] B --> C["Methodology: Core Analysis"] C --> D["OLS Regression<br>Initial association estimates"] C --> E["Instrumental Variables<br>Address endogeneity, estimate causal effect"] D & E --> F["Key Findings<br>Governance index significantly explains<br>and likely causes higher firm value"]

January 20, 2005 · 1 min · Research Team

The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications

The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications ArXiv ID: ssrn-142833 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Comparative research has shown that, even at the level of the largest firms, corporate ownership structure tends to be highly concentrated, with dispersed owner Keywords: Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure, Shareholder Concentration, Principal-Agent Problem, Blockholders, Corporate Equity Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 0.5/10 Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10 Quadrant: Philosophers Why: The paper is a qualitative review of corporate governance theories and comparative legal studies, lacking advanced mathematical formulas or statistical derivations. While it references empirical studies (e.g., La Porta et al.), it presents their findings descriptively without detailed data, backtests, or implementation-heavy analysis. flowchart TD A["Research Question<br>Prospects for Global Convergence<br>in Corporate Governance"] --> B["Methodology<br>Comparative Analysis of Ownership Structure"] B --> C["Data Input<br>Corporate Equity & Ownership<br>Structure of Largest Firms"] C --> D["Computational Process<br>Analysis of Shareholder<br>Concentration & Blockholders"] D --> E["Key Finding 1<br>Ownership is Highly Concentrated<br>Globally, not Dispersed"] D --> F["Key Finding 2<br>Principal-Agent Problem<br>persists differently across markets"] E --> G["Outcome<br>No Evidence of Global Convergence<br>Towards Dispersed Ownership Model"] F --> G

January 4, 1999 · 1 min · Research Team