The End of History for Corporate Law
The End of History for Corporate Law ArXiv ID: ssrn-204528 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Despite the apparent divergence in institutions of governance, share ownership, capital markets, and business culture across developed economies, the basic law Keywords: corporate governance, share ownership, capital markets, business culture, legal institutions, Equities Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 1.5/10 Empirical Rigor: 0.5/10 Quadrant: Philosophers Why: The paper is purely conceptual, discussing legal and normative consensus in corporate law without any mathematical formulas or empirical data; it is a theoretical analysis of legal convergence. flowchart TD A["Research Goal: Do cross-country differences in governance, ownership, and capital markets constitute a fundamental divergence, or is there a convergence?"] --> B["Methodology: Comparative Legal & Financial Analysis"] B --> C["Data Inputs: Legal doctrines, share ownership structures, capital market depth, business culture metrics"] C --> D["Analysis: Pattern matching across developed economies"] D --> E["Finding 1: Convergent forces dominate; legal forms converge toward shareholder primacy."] D --> F["Finding 2: Institutional differences (ownership, culture) persist but do not alter the core economic logic."] E --> G["Outcome: 'End of History' thesis—market forces select efficient, shareholder-centric corporate law."] F --> G