The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications
The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications ArXiv ID: ssrn-142833 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Comparative research has shown that, even at the level of the largest firms, corporate ownership structure tends to be highly concentrated, with dispersed owner Keywords: Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure, Shareholder Concentration, Principal-Agent Problem, Blockholders, Corporate Equity Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 0.5/10 Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10 Quadrant: Philosophers Why: The paper is a qualitative review of corporate governance theories and comparative legal studies, lacking advanced mathematical formulas or statistical derivations. While it references empirical studies (e.g., La Porta et al.), it presents their findings descriptively without detailed data, backtests, or implementation-heavy analysis. flowchart TD A["Research Question<br>Prospects for Global Convergence<br>in Corporate Governance"] --> B["Methodology<br>Comparative Analysis of Ownership Structure"] B --> C["Data Input<br>Corporate Equity & Ownership<br>Structure of Largest Firms"] C --> D["Computational Process<br>Analysis of Shareholder<br>Concentration & Blockholders"] D --> E["Key Finding 1<br>Ownership is Highly Concentrated<br>Globally, not Dispersed"] D --> F["Key Finding 2<br>Principal-Agent Problem<br>persists differently across markets"] E --> G["Outcome<br>No Evidence of Global Convergence<br>Towards Dispersed Ownership Model"] F --> G