Discretionary Disclosure Strategies in Corporate Narratives: Incremental Information or Impression Management?
Discretionary Disclosure Strategies in Corporate Narratives: Incremental Information or Impression Management? ArXiv ID: ssrn-1089447 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Prior research assumes that discretionary disclosures either (a) contribute to useful decision making by overcoming information asymmetries between managers and Keywords: Information Asymmetry, Voluntary Disclosure, Market Microstructure, Signaling Theory, Corporate Governance, Equity Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 2.0/10 Empirical Rigor: 3.0/10 Quadrant: Philosophers Why: The paper is a literature review synthesizing prior accounting research, focusing on taxonomies and theoretical frameworks (low math complexity) without original data analysis, backtests, or implementation details (low empirical rigor). flowchart TD A["Research Goal: Do discretionary disclosures inform investors or manage impressions?"] --> B["Method: Content analysis of corporate narratives<br/>Quantifies information vs. sentiment scores"] B --> C["Data: 10-K filings / MD&A sections<br/>Market data for price impact"] C --> D["Computational Process: Textual analysis &<br/>Regression of scores on market microstructure metrics"] D --> E{"Outcomes"} E --> F["Information Effect: Reduced information asymmetry<br/>correlates with information scores"] E --> G["Impression Management Effect: Low-content, high-sentiment<br/>disclosures show limited price impact"]