Stackelberg Game

Liquidity Competition Between Brokers and an Informed Trader ArXiv ID: 2503.08287 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We study a multi-agent setting in which brokers transact with an informed trader. Through a sequential Stackelberg-type game, brokers manage trading costs and adverse selection with an informed trader. In particular, supplying liquidity to the informed traders allows the brokers to speculate based on the flow information. They simultaneously attempt to minimize inventory risk and trading costs with the lit market based on the informed order flow, also known as the internalization-externalization strategy. We solve in closed form for the trading strategy that the informed trader uses with each broker and propose a system of equations which classify the equilibrium strategies of the brokers. By solving these equations numerically we may study the resulting strategies in equilibrium. Finally, we formulate a competitive game between brokers in order to determine the liquidity prices subject to precommitment supplied to the informed trader and provide a numerical example in which the resulting equilibrium is not Pareto efficient. ...

ADAGE: A generic two-layer framework for adaptive agent based modelling ArXiv ID: 2501.09429 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Agent-based models (ABMs) are valuable for modelling complex, potentially out-of-equilibria scenarios. However, ABMs have long suffered from the Lucas critique, stating that agent behaviour should adapt to environmental changes. Furthermore, the environment itself often adapts to these behavioural changes, creating a complex bi-level adaptation problem. Recent progress integrating multi-agent reinforcement learning into ABMs introduces adaptive agent behaviour, beginning to address the first part of this critique, however, the approaches are still relatively ad hoc, lacking a general formulation, and furthermore, do not tackle the second aspect of simultaneously adapting environmental level characteristics in addition to the agent behaviours. In this work, we develop a generic two-layer framework for ADaptive AGEnt based modelling (ADAGE) for addressing these problems. This framework formalises the bi-level problem as a Stackelberg game with conditional behavioural policies, providing a consolidated framework for adaptive agent-based modelling based on solving a coupled set of non-linear equations. We demonstrate how this generic approach encapsulates several common (previously viewed as distinct) ABM tasks, such as policy design, calibration, scenario generation, and robust behavioural learning under one unified framework. We provide example simulations on multiple complex economic and financial environments, showing the strength of the novel framework under these canonical settings, addressing long-standing critiques of traditional ABMs. ...

Deep learning for quadratic hedging in incomplete jump market ArXiv ID: 2407.13688 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We propose a deep learning approach to study the minimal variance pricing and hedging problem in an incomplete jump diffusion market. It is based upon a rigorous stochastic calculus derivation of the optimal hedging portfolio, optimal option price, and the corresponding equivalent martingale measure through the means of the Stackelberg game approach. A deep learning algorithm based on the combination of the feedforward and LSTM neural networks is tested on three different market models, two of which are incomplete. In contrast, the complete market Black-Scholes model serves as a benchmark for the algorithm’s performance. The results that indicate the algorithm’s good performance are presented and discussed. In particular, we apply our results to the special incomplete market model studied by Merton and give a detailed comparison between our results based on the minimal variance principle and the results obtained by Merton based on a different pricing principle. Using deep learning, we find that the minimal variance principle leads to typically higher option prices than those deduced from the Merton principle. On the other hand, the minimal variance principle leads to lower losses than the Merton principle. ...