Uniswap

Vote Delegation in DeFi Governance ArXiv ID: 2503.11940 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We investigate the drivers of vote delegation in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), using the Uniswap governance DAO as a laboratory. We show that parties with fewer self-owned votes and those affiliated with the controlling venture capital firm, Andreesen Horowitz (a16z), receive more vote delegations. These patterns suggest that while the Uniswap ecosystem values decentralization, a16z may engage in window-dressing around it. Moreover, we find that an active and successful track record in submitting improvement proposals, especially in the final stage, leads to more vote delegations, indicating that delegation in DAOs is at least partly reputation- or merit-based. Combined, our findings provide new insights into how governance and decentralization operate in DeFi. ...

Approaching multifractal complexity in decentralized cryptocurrency trading ArXiv ID: 2411.05951 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Multifractality is a concept that helps compactly grasping the most essential features of the financial dynamics. In its fully developed form, this concept applies to essentially all mature financial markets and even to more liquid cryptocurrencies traded on the centralized exchanges. A new element that adds complexity to cryptocurrency markets is the possibility of decentralized trading. Based on the extracted tick-by-tick transaction data from the Universal Router contract of the Uniswap decentralized exchange, from June 6, 2023, to June 30, 2024, the present study using Multifractal Detrended Fluctuation Analysis (MFDFA) shows that even though liquidity on these new exchanges is still much lower compared to centralized exchanges convincing traces of multifractality are already emerging on this new trading as well. The resulting multifractal spectra are however strongly left-side asymmetric which indicates that this multifractality comes primarily from large fluctuations and small ones are more of the uncorrelated noise type. What is particularly interesting here is the fact that multifractality is more developed for time series representing transaction volumes than rates of return. On the level of these larger events a trace of multifractal cross-correlations between the two characteristics is also observed. ...

Unified Approach for Hedging Impermanent Loss of Liquidity Provision ArXiv ID: 2407.05146 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We develop static and dynamic approaches for hedging of the impermanent loss (IL) of liquidity provision (LP) staked at Decentralised Exchanges (DEXes) which employ Uniswap V2 and V3 protocols. We provide detailed definitions and formulas for computing the IL to unify different definitions occurring in the existing literature. We show that the IL can be seen a contingent claim with a non-linear payoff for a fixed maturity date. Thus, we introduce the contingent claim termed as IL protection claim which delivers the negative of IL payoff at the maturity date. We apply arbitrage-based methods for valuation and risk management of this claim. First, we develop the static model-independent replication method for the valuation of IL protection claim using traded European vanilla call and put options. We extend and generalize an existing method to show that the IL protection claim can be hedged perfectly with options if there is a liquid options market. Second, we develop the dynamic model-based approach for the valuation and hedging of IL protection claims under a risk-neutral measure. We derive analytic valuation formulas using a wide class of price dynamics for which the characteristic function is available under the risk-neutral measure. As base cases, we derive analytic valuation formulas for IL protection claim under the Black-Scholes-Merton model and the log-normal stochastic volatility model. We finally discuss estimation of risk-reward of LP staking using our results. ...

Profit Maximization In Arbitrage Loops ArXiv ID: 2406.16600 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract Cyclic arbitrage chances exist abundantly among decentralized exchanges (DEXs), like Uniswap V2. For an arbitrage cycle (loop), researchers or practitioners usually choose a specific token, such as Ether as input, and optimize their input amount to get the net maximal amount of the specific token as arbitrage profit. By considering the tokens’ prices from CEXs in this paper, the new arbitrage profit, called monetized arbitrage profit, will be quantified as the product of the net number of a specific token we got from the arbitrage loop and its corresponding price in CEXs. Based on this concept, we put forward three different strategies to maximize the monetized arbitrage profit for each arbitrage loop. The first strategy is called the MaxPrice strategy. Under this strategy, arbitrageurs start arbitrage only from the token with the highest CEX price. The second strategy is called the MaxMax strategy. Under this strategy, we calculate the monetized arbitrage profit for each token as input in turn in the arbitrage loop. Then, we pick up the most maximal monetized arbitrage profit among them as the monetized arbitrage profit of the MaxMax strategy. The third one is called the Convex Optimization strategy. By mapping the MaxMax strategy to a convex optimization problem, we proved that the Convex Optimization strategy could get more profit in theory than the MaxMax strategy, which is proved again in a given example. We also proved that if no arbitrage profit exists according to the MaxMax strategy, then the Convex Optimization strategy can not detect any arbitrage profit, either. However, the empirical data analysis denotes that the profitability of the Convex Optimization strategy is almost equal to that of the MaxMax strategy, and the MaxPrice strategy is not reliable in getting the maximal monetized arbitrage profit compared to the MaxMax strategy. ...

Measuring Arbitrage Losses and Profitability of AMM Liquidity ArXiv ID: 2404.05803 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract This paper presents the results of a comprehensive empirical study of losses to arbitrageurs (following the formalization of loss-versus-rebalancing by [“Milionis et al., 2022”]) incurred by liquidity providers on automated market makers (AMMs). We show that those losses exceed the fees earned by liquidity providers across many of the largest AMM liquidity pools (on Uniswap). Remarkably, we also find that the Uniswap v2 pools are more profitable for passive LPs than their Uniswap v3 counterparts. We also investigate how arbitrage losses change with block times. As expected, arbitrage losses decrease when block production is faster. However, the rate of the decline varies significantly across different trading pairs. For instance, when comparing 100ms block times to Ethereum’s current 12-second block times, the decrease in losses to arbitrageurs ranges between 20% to 70%, depending on the specific trading pair. ...

Layer 2 be or Layer not 2 be: Scaling on Uniswap v3 ArXiv ID: 2403.09494 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract This paper studies the market structure impact of cheaper and faster chains on the Uniswap v3 Protocol. The Uniswap Protocol is the largest decentralized application on Ethereum by both gas and blockspace used, and user behaviors of the protocol are very sensitive to fluctuations in gas prices and market structure due to the economic factors of the Protocol. We focus on the chains where Uniswap v3 has the most activity, giving us the best comparison to Ethereum mainnet. Because of cheaper gas and lower block times, we find evidence that the majority of swaps get better gas-adjusted execution on these chains, liquidity providers are more capital efficient, and liquidity providers have increased fee returns from more arbitrage. We also present evidence that two second block times may be too long for optimal liquidity provider returns, compared to first come, first served. We argue that many of the current drawbacks with AMMs may be due to chain dynamics and are vastly improved with cheaper and faster transactions ...

An Empirical Analysis of Scam Tokens on Ethereum Blockchain ArXiv ID: 2402.19399 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract This article presents an empirical investigation into the determinants of total revenue generated by counterfeit tokens on Uniswap. It offers a detailed overview of the counterfeit token fraud process, along with a systematic summary of characteristics associated with such fraudulent activities observed in Uniswap. The study primarily examines the relationship between revenue from counterfeit token scams and their defining characteristics, and analyzes the influence of market economic factors such as return on market capitalization and price return on Ethereum. Key findings include a significant increase in overall transactions of counterfeit tokens on their first day of fraud, and a rise in upfront fraud costs leading to corresponding increases in revenue. Furthermore, a negative correlation is identified between the total revenue of counterfeit tokens and the volatility of Ethereum market capitalization return, while price return volatility on Ethereum is found to have a positive impact on counterfeit token revenue, albeit requiring further investigation for a comprehensive understanding. Additionally, the number of subscribers for the real token correlates positively with the realized volume of scam tokens, indicating that a larger community following the legitimate token may inadvertently contribute to the visibility and success of counterfeit tokens. Conversely, the number of Telegram subscribers exhibits a negative impact on the realized volume of scam tokens, suggesting that a higher level of scrutiny or awareness within Telegram communities may act as a deterrent to fraudulent activities. Finally, the timing of when the scam token is introduced on the Ethereum blockchain may have a negative impact on its success. Notably, the cumulative amount scammed by only 42 counterfeit tokens amounted to almost 11214 Ether. ...

Don’t Let MEV Slip: The Costs of Swapping on the Uniswap Protocol ArXiv ID: 2309.13648 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We present the first in-depth empirical characterization of the costs of trading on a decentralized exchange (DEX). Using quoted prices from the Uniswap Labs interface for two pools – USDC-ETH (5bps) and PEPE-ETH (30bps) – we evaluate the efficiency of trading on DEXs. Our main tool is slippage – the difference between the realized execution price of a trade, and its quoted price – which we breakdown into its benign and adversarial components. We also present an alternative way to quantify and identify slippage due to adversarial reordering of transactions, which we call reordering slippage, that does not require quoted prices or mempool data to calculate. We find that the composition of transaction costs varies tremendously with the trade’s characteristics. Specifically, while for small swaps, gas costs dominate costs, for large swaps price-impact and slippage account for the majority of it. Moreover, when trading PEPE, a popular ‘memecoin’, the probability of adversarial slippage is about 80% higher than when trading a mature asset like USDC. Overall, our results provide preliminary evidence that DEXs offer a compelling trust-less alternative to centralized exchanges for trading digital assets. ...

Fragmentation and optimal liquidity supply on decentralized exchanges ArXiv ID: 2307.13772 “View on arXiv” Authors: Unknown Abstract We investigate how liquidity providers (LPs) choose between high- and low-fee trading venues, in the face of a fixed common gas cost. Analyzing Uniswap data, we find that high-fee pools attract 58% of liquidity supply yet execute only 21% of volume. Large LPs dominate low-fee pools, frequently adjusting out-of-range positions in response to informed order flow. In contrast, small LPs converge to high-fee pools, accepting lower execution probabilities to mitigate adverse selection and liquidity management costs. Fragmented liquidity dominates a single-fee market, as it encourages more liquidity providers to enter the market, while fostering LP competition on the low-fee pool. ...