The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct ArXiv ID: ssrn-2739590 “View on arXiv”
Authors: Unknown
Abstract We construct a novel database containing the universe of financial advisers in the United States from 2005 to 2015, representing approximately 10% of employment
Keywords: Financial Advisers, Wealth Management, Labor Market, Investment Advisory, Asset Allocation, Asset Management Services
Complexity vs Empirical Score Math Complexity: 3.5/10 Empirical Rigor: 8.5/10 Quadrant: Street Traders Why: The paper’s mathematics is primarily statistical and econometric (e.g., comparisons of proportions, regression analysis on job turnover), scoring a moderate 3.5. The empirical rigor is extremely high, driven by the construction of a novel, large-scale database covering the universe of U.S. financial advisers over 10 years and the use of detailed, implementable data on employment history, misconduct disclosures, and settlements. flowchart TD A["Research Goal: How does adviser misconduct affect<br>the market for financial advice?"] --> B subgraph B["Methodology & Data"] B1["(Novel Database: 2005-2015,<br>~10% of US Advisers)"] B2["Match to BrokerCheck & CRD<br>Regulatory Disclosures"] B3["Link to Employment History<br>& Asset Allocation Data"] end B --> C{"Computational Analysis"} C --> D["Estimate Impact on<br>Employment, Wages, & Assets"] C --> E["Test Market Segmentation<br>by Firm Type & Geography"] D --> F["Key Findings: Advisers with<br>misconduct face severe penalties"] E --> F