Crypto gives researchers something traditional markets never could: fully transparent, public market data — every trade, every liquidity position, every liquidation, on-chain and downloadable. The result is a research field where microstructure questions that took decades to answer for equities get answered in months, alongside genuinely new objects of study: automated market makers, MEV, stablecoin mechanisms, and perpetual futures funding.
Quality varies more here than in any other hub. The strongest work treats crypto as a natural laboratory — testing arbitrage, momentum, and market-making theory against complete data. The weakest imports an equity-market technique, runs it on three years of BTC prices, and declares alpha. Check the sample period against regime shifts (pre/post 2021 institutional entry, exchange collapses) before trusting any backtest, and note that many exploitable inefficiencies documented in 2018-era papers have long since been arbitraged away.
Related hubs: Market Microstructure, Statistical Arbitrage, NLP & LLMs in Finance.
Consider a finite set of trade orders and automated market makers (AMMs) at some state. We propose a solution to the problem of finding an equilibrium price vector to execute all the orders jointly with corresponding optimal AMMs swaps. The solution is based on Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem. We disc
Entities like centralized cryptocurrency exchanges fall under the business category of virtual asset service providers (VASPs). As any other enterprise, they can become insolvent. VASPs enable the exchange, custody, and transfer of cryptoassets organized in wallets across distributed ledger technolo
Silkswap is an automated market maker model designed for efficient stablecoin trading with minimal price impact. The original purpose of Silkswap is to facilitate the trading of fiat-pegged stablecoins with the stablecoin Silk, but it can be applied to any pair of stablecoins. The Silkswap invariant
We study liquidity provision in automated market makers when trading in the external market incurs proportional transaction costs. We consider both separately collected fees and fees retained in reserves. The benchmark is a self-financing strategy holding the same total risky inventory and trading a
Anonymized risk sharing requires no information about agents’ preferences, identities, private operations, or realized losses. It is especially relevant in the digital economy, with applications such as P2P health-care insurance, revenue sharing for digital music and videos, and blockchain mining po
Reputation is a fundamental mechanism through which markets sustain trust when service quality cannot be perfectly assessed ex ante, constituting a form of intertemporal economic capital by attracting future demand. Its effectiveness as a disciplinary mechanism depends not only on past interactions
This paper presents a Multi Agent Bitcoin Trading system that utilizes Large Language Models (LLMs) for alpha generation and portfolio management in the cryptocurrencies market. Unlike equities, cryptocurrencies exhibit extreme volatility and are heavily influenced by rapidly shifting market sentime
Building on our prior threshold-based analysis of six months of Poloniex trading data, we have extended both the temporal span and granularity of our study by incorporating minute-level OHLCV records for 1021 tokens around each confirmed pump-and-dump event. First, we algorithmically identify the ac
Financial Sentiment Analysis (FSA) traditionally relies on human-annotated sentiment labels to infer investor sentiment and forecast market movements. However, inferring the potential market impact of words based on their human-perceived intentions is inherently challenging. We hypothesize that the
This paper examines a semi-analytical approach for pricing American options in time-inhomogeneous models characterized by negative interest rates (for equity/FX) or negative convenience yields (for commodities/cryptocurrencies). Under such conditions, exercise boundaries may exhibit a “floating” str
We provide an economic model of Execution Tickets and use it to study the ability of the Ethereum protocol to capture MEV from block construction. We demonstrate that Execution Tickets extract all MEV when all buyers are homogeneous, risk neutral and face no capital costs. We also show that MEV capt
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) money markets have seen explosive growth in recent years, with billions of dollars borrowed in various cryptocurrency assets. Key to the safety of money markets is the implementation of interest rates that determine the cost of borrowing, and govern counterparty exposure
We engineer blockchain based risk managed portfolios by creating three funds with distinct risk and return profiles: 1) Alpha - high risk portfolio; 2) Beta - mimics the wider market; and 3) Gamma - represents the risk free rate adjusted to beat inflation. Each of the sub-funds (Alpha, Beta and Gamm
The gas fee, paid for inclusion in the blockchain, is analyzed in two parts. First, we consider how effort in terms of resources required to process and store a transaction turns into a gas limit, which, through a fee, comprised of the base and priority fee in the current version of Ethereum, is con
Forecasting cryptocurrencies as a financial issue is crucial as it provides investors with possible financial benefits. A small improvement in forecasting performance can lead to increased profitability; therefore, obtaining a realistic forecast is very important for investors. Successful forecastin
In the ever evolving landscape of decentralized finance automated market makers (AMMs) play a key role: they provide a market place for trading assets in a decentralized manner. For so-called bluechip pairs, arbitrage activity provides a major part of the revenue generation of AMMs but also a major
In a universal framework that expresses any market system in terms of state transition rules, we prove that every DeFi market system has an invariant function and is thus by definition a CFMM; indeed, all automated market makers (AMMs) are CFMMs. Invariants connect directly to arbitrage and to compl
Cryptocurrencies and Bitcoin, in particular, are prone to wild swings resulting in frequent jumps in prices, making them historically popular for traders to speculate. A better understanding of these fluctuations can greatly benefit crypto investors by allowing them to make informed decisions. It is
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) is value extractable by temporary monopoly power commonly found in decentralized systems. This extraction stems from a lack of user privacy upon transaction submission and the ability of a monopolist validator to reorder, add, and/or censor transactions. There are two
We present the first in-depth empirical characterization of the costs of trading on a decentralized exchange (DEX). Using quoted prices from the Uniswap Labs interface for two pools – USDC-ETH (5bps) and PEPE-ETH (30bps) – we evaluate the efficiency of trading on DEXs. Our main tool is slippage – th